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Abstract 
 
Complex networks such as transportation networks, the Internet, and electrical power 
grids are fundamental parts of modern life, and their robustness under any attack or fault has 
always been a concern. Failure and intentional removal of components in complex networks 
might affect the flow of information and change balance of flows in the network. This 
phenomenon may require load redistribution all over the network. Component overloaded can 
act as a trigger for a chain of overload failures. This overload, could, for example, increase the 
amount of information a router must transmit and ultimately make internet congestion.  
One of the major applications of complex network theory is to study power systems. 
Power systems are the most complex human-made infrastructures, and almost every individual's 
life is dependent on electrical energy and resilient functioning of power systems. Recently, there 
have been many reports about massive power outages leaving vast areas without power that 
sometimes takes a few days to have the power back. One of the most critical areas in the power 
system is the root cause analysis of such catastrophes and trying to resolve them. From an 
electrical engineering point of view, these power outages occur following an initial failure due 
to problems, such as generators tripping, transformers overheating, faulty power generation 
units, damage to the transmission system, substations or distribution systems, or overloading of 
the power system. A faulty protection relay or malicious attack to control centres can also trigger 
it. In any of these cases, the failed component will be out of service immediately and to keep 
the robust power delivery to all customers, their loads should be redistributed across the power 
system, and henceforth some of them might become overloaded as well, and accordingly get 
out of service. This chain of failures can be propagated all over the system and lead to a 
catastrophic blackout. This thesis conducts a full study on how to mitigate cascade failures in 
complex networks. 
First, cascade depth is applied to quantify nodes criticality for cascade failures. Then, a 
wide range of node centrality parameters is considered to find out the relationship between the 
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node vitality and these centralities. To discover the structure of cascade propagation in complex 
networks, the edge geodesic distance is considered for computing the structural distance 
between two arbitrary edges in the network. Then, starting with the single edge removal events, 
the route that cascade tends to spread is studied. In the next step, the impact of two or three 
concurrent edge removals on the way the cascade spreads are examined. Besides, the power 
system vulnerability is studied using the maximum flow algorithm based on Ford-Fulkerson 
method and critical capacity parameters are identified. A synthetic model with the same 
properties as a real power system is generated and examined. For a power line, to be overloaded, 
a new method is developed to overpass across the network and shortlist the busbars for load 
reduction. Next, a novel sensitivity method is formulated based on AC load flow analysis to 
rank the loads according to their effect on the lines power flow. 
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Chapter 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1    Preface 
The occurrence of cascades of failures leading to whole system collapse like large-scale 
blackouts in power grids has motivated scholars to develop effective methods to model and 
analyse the dynamics of this phenomenon. One of the most effective and easy to apply 
mathematical representatives of real-world systems is a complex network. It consists of number 
of connected elements, which communicate and interact through the links; where elements and 
links can be abstracted and modelled as nodes and edges of the network, respectively. It has 
been shown that many real-world networks have several common properties such as scale-free 
degree distribution, small-worldness, densification and community structure. In this chapter, the 
background of cascade failures in complex network and its application in power systems is 
briefly overviewed. Also, the motivation of this work and the scope of the research are 
explained. Moreover, the objectives and the contribution of this work are listed and discussed. 
Finally, the structure of the thesis and significant context of other chapters are briefly illustrated.   
 
1.2    Complex Networks 
Complex networks are pervasively everywhere in many fields ranging from engineering 
to biology, physics, and sociology (Strogatz, 2001, Albert and Barabasi, 2002). Resiliency 
against cascade failure is a striking property that many real-world networks possess. Human-
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made networks should also have high levels of resiliency in order to function correctly. When 
it comes to an error in network components or targeted attacks to its vital elements, it has been 
shown that the structure of complex networks plays a critical role in their resilience against such 
events (Watts, 2002, Moreno et al., 2002). For instance, when degree-based attacks are 
considered, scale-free networks are vulnerable, despite being resilient against random errors 
(Albert et al., 2000) 
In studying complex networks, we investigate the statistical properties of their nodes with 
their interconnections. Numerous network properties and performance measures can be 
determined using network topologies. We need to investigate the networks statistical properties 
in detail to better comprehend the networks’ behaviour.  
 
1.3    Power System Overview 
Power systems are of the most important and probably complicated infrastructures 
humans have ever made. The existence of a variety of components with diverse operational 
modes and dynamics, along with its ever-growing structure, make it difficult to study it in detail. 
So far, many scholars have placed it under scrutiny from their point of view using simplified 
models. Undoubtedly, in this modern era, all of us are dependent on the proper functioning of 
the power system, and their continuous power delivery is crucial for our lives and wellbeing. 
Therefore, power outage at any level has a direct effect on countries’ industrial and commercial 
services  (Bompard et al., 2011). A power grid is vulnerable to natural catastrophes such as 
earthquakes and Tsunamis as well as to deliberate attacks such as an Electromagnetic Pulse 
attack or cyber-attack to control centres (Bernstein, 2012). A power grid can be modelled as a 
complex network with nodes representing the generators, transformers and loads and links 
describing the transmission lines (Chassin and Posse, 2005, Rosato et al., 2007, Rosa et al., 
2007, Solé et al., 2008b, Saniee Monfared et al., 2014, Wang et al., 2011). The edges in this 
model could be weighed by their loads, impedance or admittance to describe the power system 
parameters. A failure in one of the network components (nodes and edges) may cause other 
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components to go beyond their capacity, and consequently fail. Such failures can spread through 
the network and result in a cascade failure process (Buldyrev et al., 2010, Crucitti et al., 2004b, 
Ren and Dobson, 2008). 
Mirzasoleiman et al. (Mirzasoleiman et al., 2011) investigated the tolerance of cascading 
failures in weighted networks using three weighting strategies. Saniee Monfared et al. (Saniee 
Monfared et al., 2014) studied the structural properties of the ultra-high voltage power 
transmission network of Iran. According to their findings, the Iranian power grid is a small-
world network with exponential degree distribution. They also studied the influence of 
cascading failures on the largest connected component of the network and found it vulnerable. 
Cuffe (Cuffe, 2017) investigated the impact of a complicated intentional attack against 
transmission lines of a classic electrical power system. 
Despite all the endeavours that scientists and engineers put forward to make the power 
system work robustly and avoid the faults and power cutoffs, failures take place, and 
unfortunately, sometimes they happen intentionally by criminals. Ukraine 2015 large-scale 
blackout caused by cyber-attacks to the power systems (Liang et al., 2017). 
One resolution to deter the catastrophic situations caused by cascade is load shedding 
which has been a classical and a quite reliable mitigation strategy (Laghari et al., 2015, Reddy 
et al., 2014, Gu et al., 2014, Ketabi and Fini, 2017, Ketabi and Fini, 2015, Rudez and Mihalic, 
2016, Shekari et al., 2016, Dong et al., 2017, Amraee and Saberi, 2017). However, any load 
curtailment in power systems might cause customer discomfort, and thus such a strategy might 
not be the ideal solution in some power systems. In this thesis, we focus on two novel methods: 
The First method is to make the power system resilient by setting the edges’ capacity to their 
critical value. Finding this value for edges at each attack scenario and setting the parameter 
higher than that results in making the networks resilient against failure. An alternative solution 
is to predict the edge(s) which might fail at the next step by tracing the cascade propagation 
route. These two methods will be discussed in detail in the coming chapters. 
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1.4    Motivation 
In case the cascade failure is triggered in a power system, there are some classical methods 
to deter it from leading to a blackout such as islanding or load shedding. These methods, 
unfortunately, always leave a segment of power system unserved. As a result, they become a 
big challenge for power systems since they cause customers discomfort, and, in some cases, the 
power system operators are penalised by their sensitive customers. There are some gaps in the 
literature that this thesis targets to fill. 
First, it is worth finding vital nodes in complex networks related to their centrality 
measures which can be used to mitigate cascade failures in complex networks by putting more 
protection on critical components and also removing nodes ranked high in terms of those 
centrality measures showing negative correlations with the cascade depth. 
Second, when a single transmission line fails in the power system due to an overload or 
even a protection relay malfunction, if it could trigger a cascade of failures, the pathway that 
this failure is propagated is vague and there is no information and analysis as a fast indication 
for network planners and operators to find out which component is going to fail next; therefore, 
they can put more protection or preventive measures to deter the cascade from spreading.  
Third, it would be beneficial to study the potential vulnerability of power systems in the 
design and planning stage and find the worst failure cases which can draw the power systems to 
a total blackout state. It can be helpful to reconsider the power lines carrying power using critical 
capacity concept.   
Fourth, when a power line connecting two substations is working close to its loading 
limits, reducing the overall load it is directly feeding would be a good measure to lift some 
pressure from that line. But there is no specific method in the literature to find and target these 
loads to be reduced, such that the loading level in that particular line does not exceed its 
limitations.    
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1.5    Thesis Objectives and Contributions 
This thesis is mainly focused on cascade failures in complex networks which aims to 
discover the root cause of this phenomenon and develop the methods to deter it from occurring. 
The academic objective of this work is to create a context to analyse complex networks in terms 
of potential cascade failures and recommend the preventive methods to control its propagation. 
To be specific, there are four distinct goals for this thesis: 
 
1. Vital node identification (Chapter 4): Conducting a comprehensive analysis to 
discover the relationship between the centrality parameters of nodes in complex 
networks and the severity of the cascade by removing the nodes with those properties.  
2. Cascade propagation structure (Chapter 5): Determining the cascade pathway in 
complex networks through an extensive analysis of the cascade propagation route 
following a single or concurrent edge removals in complex networks and differentiate 
the cascade trajectory orientations between them. 
3. Power system vulnerability (Chapter 6): Developing an approach to analysing the 
structural vulnerability of power systems when removal of the highest loaded line 
initiates the cascade. Also, this method determines the critical capacity parameter for 
power systems which setting the corresponding parameter higher than that, makes the 
power system resilient against cascade failures. 
4. Selective load reduction (Chapter 6): Designing and developing a framework to 
analyse and determine a set of candidate busbars and rank them to reduce the loading 
in a specific power line to prevent it from failure and triggering the cascade. 
 
1.5.1  Contributions 
Here is the summary of the contributions of this research work:  
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1. Vital node identification (Chapter 4): 
a. Calculating the correlation between the cascade depth of nodes and their 
centrality parameters. 
b. Applying the concept cascade depth of a node to study the criticality of a 
node in a complex network. 
2. Cascade propagation structure (Chapter 5): 
a. Introducing the Edge Geodesic Distance parameter to study the cascade 
propagation route. 
b. Developing an algorithm to compute the cascade propagation route when 
the cascade is triggered by a single edge failure using the edge geodesic 
distance. 
c. Developing an algorithm to compute the cascade propagation pathway for 
the case that cascade is triggered by concurrent edge removal. 
3. Power system vulnerability (Chapter 6):  
a) Introducing the critical capacity parameter for power systems and applying it 
for a real power system.  
b) Developing a synthetic model for the real power system to validate the 
proposed method to study the power system vulnerability. 
4. Selective load reduction (Chapter 6): 
a. Developing A novel traverse method to find the best candidate set of loads 
in the power system to rank for each transmission line. 
b. Establishing a new sensitivity method to rank the loads based on inverse 
Jacobian matrix. 
 
1.6    Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. First, mathematical tools based on complex 
networks are introduced to model real networks such as power systems. Then, structural 
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centrality measures, which are used to quantify the importance of components or distinguish the 
different network topologies, are defined. The most used structural centrality measures, 
neighbourhood-, path-, and flow-based are categorised and explained. Also, in chapter two, the 
complex network models of power systems consisting of minimum distance, synthetic spatial 
graphs, AC/DC models, are reviewed. This chapter is wrapped up by summarising all 
benchmark networks which are going to be used in simulations in this thesis.  
In chapter three, initially, the process of the cascade in complex networks is reviewed. 
Then, different cascade failure models based on complex networks including structural and 
component cascade dependent models and their analysis methods are discussed. Next, the 
dynamic cascade failure models for power grids including OPA, Hidden Failure and Manchester 
models are inspected.  
In a complex network model of real systems represented by nodes and edges; different 
nodes have a distinct impact on overall functionality and resiliency of networks against failures. 
To study this, in chapter four, several synthetic networks and real networks are put under 
scrutiny, and a metric is introduced to measure the cascade depth of a node and hence identify 
the most vulnerable nodes which need solid protection measures to deter them from failure.  
Following that, in chapter five, we find the trajectory of cascade propagation in complex 
networks when it is initialized by single edge removal or concurrent removal of a few edges. 
The difference in the cascade spreading trends between these two cases will be pointed out to 
be applied in controlling the propagation of cascade failures. 
The first section of chapter six is dedicated to studying the vulnerability of power systems 
against cascade failures. The very well-known Ford Fulkerson model based on maximum flow 
theory is applied to assign the loads to all power lines in a real power system as well as a 
synthetic spatial power network consisting different types of nodes for representing generators, 
loads and intermediate busbars. In second part of this chapter, to mitigate the cascade failure 
triggered by a nearly overloaded line failure, a strategy is proposed that is more efficient than 
classical load shedding algorithms. The proposed ‘selective load reduction’ is meant to reduce 
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the load only in a small portion of the network based on the lines’ flow sensitivity to various 
loads.  
Finally, in chapter seven, all findings of this thesis are summarised, and future research 
directions are outlined. 
 
1.7    Summary 
In this chapter, the background of cascade failures in complex networks was introduced.  
Also, the motivation of this work, as well as the scope of research was explained. Moreover, the 
objectives and the contribution of this work were listed and discussed. Finally, the structure of 
the thesis and the significant context of other chapters were briefly illustrated.  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2  
 
COMPLEX NETWORK MODELS   
 
 
 
2.1    Introduction 
Networks are ubiquitous, and we encounter a large number of them whenever any 
communication conducted, or information interchanged. Generally, a complex network consists 
of a collection of nodes (vertices) and a selection of edges (links) connecting these nodes. In its 
simplest case, the nodes in the network are all the same, but more complicated models can also 
be considered. Sometimes the edges can be weighted by the links’ physical parameters. A simple 
form of a complex network is shown in Fig. 2.1. 
 
 
Fig. 2. 1 A simple form of complex network consisting of nodes and edges 
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Fig. 2. 2 The adjacency matrix representation of a complex network with five nodes and directed edges 
 
The simplest mathematical model for a complex network is an adjacency matrix. In Fig. 
2.2, an example of an adjacency matrix for a complex network with five nodes and directed 
edges is displayed. 
 
 
Fig. 2. 3 The Konigsberg problem graph  
(https://physics.weber.edu/carroll/honors/konigsberg.htm) 
 
Complex networks represented by graphs, such as the Internet (Gan et al., 2014), World 
Wide Web (Fujimura et al., 2005), engineering (Saleh et al., 2018, Saleh et al., 2017), social 
(Hai-bo et al., 2008) and biological networks (Habibi et al., 2014) have been broadly 
investigated recently, and this area of study is developed rapidly. Historically, in 1736 when 
Leonhard Euler, a Swiss mathematician, solved the Konigsberg Bridges problem, the graph 
theory was introduced. At that time, people in Konigsberg tried to walk around the city by 
crossing each of its seven bridges exactly once and return to the starting point. After a while, 
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they came up to the conclusion that such a path does not exist. Euler published his solution 
where he proved that it was not possible to find such a path.  First, he labelled four lands as A, 
B, C, and D and the seven bridges a, b, c, d, e, f, and g as shown in Fig. 2.3. 
 Euler represented the walking trip as a sequence of the land letters A, B, C, and D.  There 
is a bridge between neighbouring letters.  He noted that land A has five bridges crossing and the 
others have three bridges. Finally, using the frequency of land letters appear in the sequence of 
land letters, he finished the proof that there is no solution for the Konigsberg Bridges problem. 
 
2.1.1 Synthetic Networks 
When a hypothesis is to be tested, we need appropriate real-world networks for applying 
the algorithms or methods on them; however, in many cases, there are not such well-fitted 
networks. Hence, we need to create synthetic networks to construct model networks with similar 
properties to real ones. In this section, the most frequently studied synthetic complex networks 
are listed. 
 
Erdos-Renyi Model 
The random network theory began with one specific model, initially studied by two 
Hungarian mathematicians, Paul Erdös and Alfred Rényi (1959). Now the model is called the 
Erdös-Rényi Random Graph, which is an abstract mathematical model for creating graphs. 
Erdos-Renyi random networks are constructed by creating a link between any two nodes with 
probability P. It can be shown that the degree distribution in ER model follows Poisson 
distribution. For a long time, most of the real network studies were considered to be ER random 
networks. An ER network with N=9 and P=0.5 is shown in Fig. 2.4. 
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Fig. 2. 4 Sample Erdos-Renyi random network with N = 9 nodes and connection probability P = 0.5. 
 
The ER graphs lack two remarkable properties of many real-world networks: 
1. Since there is a constant, and independent probability of connection between each 
pair of nodes, the clustering coefficient in ER graphs is low. 
2. The hub nodes are less likely to be formed in ER graphs, mainly because their degree 
distribution converges to a Poisson distribution rather than a power law which is the 
case in plenty of many real-world networks.  
Hence, the other types of network models were introduced by other scholars, accounting 
for mimicking such properties of real networks. 
 
Watts-Strogatz Model 
The Watts-Strogatz model is a simple model to cope with the first limitation above. It 
comes up with higher clustering while maintaining the average path lengths of the ER model. It 
generally interpolates between an ER graph and a ring network. As a result, the model can 
address "small-world" phenomenon which is observed in a variety of real networks such as food 
webs, power systems, neural networks of the brain, social influence networks and movie actors’ 
network. The algorithm to generate a WS network is as follows. Given the number of nodes N, 
an even integer K as the mean degree, and a probability parameter p, the algorithm generates an 
undirected graph consisting of N nodes and 
𝑁𝐾
2
 edges using the following steps: 
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Fig. 2. 5 Comparing the structural properties of a random network and a WS small-world network (N = 14 AND K = 4). 
(a) Random graph: Average degree = 2.71, Average shortest path length = 2.52, Clustering coefficient = 0.05; (b) WS small-
world network: Average degree= 4, Average shortest path length = 1.95, Clustering coefficient = 0.37.  
 
1. Generate a regular ring network, a graph with N nodes each connected to 
𝐾
2
 neighbours 
from each side.  
2. For every node vi remove the edges eij with i<j and rewire it with probability p to 
make the edge eik where k is selected using uniform probability among all possible 
values avoiding self-loops and duplicated links. In Fig. 2.5. The properties of a small 
world network are compared to a random network. 
 
Barabasi-Albert Model 
Two above models result in networks with almost homogeneous degree distribution. In a 
scale-free network, the degree distribution follows a power law, i.e., the probability of having nodes with 
degree k, P(k), has a power-law relationship with the degree, i.e. P(k)=k-γ where γ is the power-law 
exponent that is typically 2 < γ < 3 for many real systems. However, it has been shown that many real-
world networks have heavy-tailed degree distribution, for which many nodes have small 
degrees, while few have much larger degrees. Such networks are known as scale-free networks, 
and we use the preferential attachment algorithm to construct them.  In the preferential 
attachment mechanism, the nodes with a higher degree, are more likely to receive new links. 
Intuitively, if the considered network is a social network connecting people, a link from A to B 
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means that person A "knows" person B. Highly connected nodes represent well-known people. 
Every newcomer is more likely to become acquainted with people with higher visibility 
compared to a relatively unknown person. Here is the algorithm for generating BA network 
(Albert and Barabasi, 2002). Initially, the network has m0 all-to-all connected nodes. Each new 
node is added to the network and connected to m ≤ m0 existing nodes. The probability of 
connection is proportional to existing nodes degree. i.e.  
 𝑝𝑖 =
𝑘𝑖
∑ 𝑘𝑗𝑗
 (2-1) 
where ki is the degree of node vi. In this algorithm, the highly connected nodes ("hubs") will be 
connected to even more links, while nodes with lower degrees are unlikely to be chosen for 
connection to new nodes. That means the new nodes "prefer" to get connected to the already 
massively connected nodes. In Fig. 2.6 the BA network with m0=4, m=2 and a total number of 
nodes N=100 is sketched. 
In this thesis, we use the algorithm proposed in reference (Jalili et al., 2015), which 
expands the original preferential attachment algorithm proposed by Barabasi and Albert by 
adding a tunable real parameter B to demonstrate the initial magnetism of the nodes. At each 
step, the links are connected to existing nodes with probability  
 𝑝𝑖 =
(𝑘𝑖+𝐵)
∑ (𝑘𝑗+𝐵)
𝑁
𝑗=1
 (2-2) 
Later on, many researchers found that a lot of real-world networks from chemical 
reactions to physics, food web to biology, engineering and sociology share many structural 
properties (Strogatz, 2001). Putting these properties under scrutiny would give a good insight 
into the underlying phenomena of the system. For example, studying social networks provides 
a good idea about how information spread in a network of people or biological network has lots 
of useful information about the evolution of organisations and their units (Barabasi and Oltvai, 
2004).  
Also, working on the networks based on the world wide web helps scholars in developing 
methods to conduct more productive navigation and search on the internet (Kleinberg, 2000). 
  
 
2.2 Structural Centrality Measures  15 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. 6 BA network generated by preferential attachment method (m0 = 4, m = 4, N = 18). 
 
In this chapter, we review some essential concepts of complex network theory and the 
methods to apply them to the power systems. 
 
2.2    Structural Centrality Measures 
Due to the complex structure of synthetic and real networks, we need to summarise and 
abstract their behaviours by using metrics measuring their structural properties. Generally 
speaking, a centrality measure assigns a real value to each network component, which is 
expected to be proportional to the importance of that particular component of the network 
(Freeman, 1977b, Bonacich, 1987, Borgatti, 2005, Borgatti and Everett, 2006). In this section, 
we review several critical structural centralities used widely in the complex network area.  
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2.2.1 Neighbourhood-Based Centralities 
In this part of the thesis, we consider unweighted and undirected networks. Let’s denote 
the complex network as G = (V, E), with V and E being the set of nodes and links, respectively. 
The network can be represented by its adjacency matrix A = [aij], where aij = 1 if an edge exists 
between nodes vi and vj, and aij = 0 otherwise. We consider networks without any self-loops, 
i.e., aii = 0. The centrality of a node (or edge) in a network determines its importance in a 
particular functionality of the network. A centrality index assigns a score to all nodes indicating 
their vitality in the network. Due to the implicit meaning of ‘importance’, disparate indices have 
been introduced to cover the concept.  
 
Degree Centrality 
The most trivial method to evaluate the centrality of nodes accounts for the number of 
immediate neighbours of a node which is presented as degree centrality. The degree ki of node 
vi is the number of edges incidents on that node: 
 𝑘𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑗  (2-3) 
Because the degree centrality is computationally a low complex method compared to more 
complicated centralities like betweenness, closeness and eigenvector centralities; it is applied in 
many applications like controlling the animal disease epidemics (Candeloro et al., 2016). In a 
directed network, the edges have direction on them. This property provides two different degrees 
for each node; in-degree and out-degree. For example, in a citation network, if paper A cites 
paper B, there is a link from node A to node B, and the in-degree of a node shows its popularity 
and importance. 
The Average Node Degree is calculated as the average of degrees of all nodes as  
 ?̅? =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  (2-4) 
This parameter is an indication of how densely the nodes in the network are connected. 
While the average node degree represents a particular structural property of a network, it 
happens that the networks with the same average node degree have entirely distinct topologies. 
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To grasp another feature of the network using its topological properties, the Node Degree 
Distribution, P(k), is applied that is defined as the probability that a randomly chosen node has 
the degree k. It is described as equation 2-5. 
 𝑃(𝑘) =
𝑁(𝑘)
𝑁
 (2-5) 
where N(k) represents the number of the nodes with degree k. 
 
Fig. 2. 7 Node degree distributions (a) power-law distribution, (b) Poisson distribution. 
 
Two popular node degree distributions in real networks are the power-law distribution and 
the Poisson distribution. In power-law distribution, P(k) relates to the degree parameter k, with 
equation 2-6. 
 𝑃(𝑘)∿𝑘−𝛾  (2-6) 
In this equation, γ is the power-law exponent. In a network with power-law degree 
distribution, a significant portion of nodes have a small number of connections whereas a small 
part of nodes has a large number of edges connected; i.e. the network is heterogeneous. 
In the Poisson distribution, the probability P(k) is changed with k as equation 2-7. 
 𝑃(𝑘) =
𝑒−𝜆𝜆−𝑘
𝑘!
 (2-7) 
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with 𝜆 = ?̅?, being the average node degree of the network. In networks with a Poisson degree 
distribution, no hub node can be formed and most of the nodes have the same degree; i.e. the 
network is homogeneous. 
Poisson and power-law degree distributions are shown in Fig. 2.7. 
It is essential to know if the nodes with the same degrees are connected (Degree Assortativity). 
One way to quantify this is by using the degree-degree correlation displayed in equation 2-8 
 𝑟 =
1
𝐸
∑ 𝑘𝑖𝑘𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑗>𝑖 −[
1
𝐸
∑
1
2
(𝑘𝑖+𝑘𝑗)𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑗>𝑖 ]
2
1
𝐸
∑ (𝑘𝑖
2+𝑘𝑗
2)𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑗>𝑖 −[
1
𝐸
∑
1
2
(𝑘𝑖+𝑘𝑗)𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑗>𝑖 ]
2 (2-8) 
where E is the total number of edges, ki is the degree of node vi and aij is the entry (i,j) in 
the adjacency matrix. According to the value of r, there are three types of networks: 
• r > 0: The network is called assortative; i.e. the nodes with higher degree intend to connect 
and the nodes with lower degrees are connected (rich with rich, poor with poor) 
• r < 0: The network is called disassortative; i.e. the nodes with higher degree intend to connect 
the nodes with lower degrees and the nodes with low degrees intend to connect to the nodes 
with higher degrees (rich with poor) 
• r = 0: The is no intention for the connection between the nodes regarding their degree 
Node degree is a simple centrality measure that needs only local information on the nodes. 
The degree is indeed the most natural centrality measure to compute and has been shown to 
control many of the network functions. 
 
Local Rank 
To obtain an effective ranking parameter to overcome computationally complex 
calculations in large-scale networks, Chen et al. (Chen et al., 2012) proposed another local 
centrality measure, called Local Rank, which considers information on nodes’ fourth-order 
neighbours. Local rank is a compromise between the degree centrality and other time-
consuming measures. The Local Rank of each node vi is computed as follows: 
 𝐿𝑅(𝑖) = ∑ 𝑄(𝑗)𝑗∈𝛤𝑖   (2-9) 
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 𝑄(𝑗) = ∑ 𝑅(𝑘)𝑘∈𝛤𝑗    (2-10) 
where Γi is the set of immediate neighbours of vi and R(k) accounts for the number of immediate 
and the next immediate neighbours of vk. 
  
Clustering Coefficient 
Another measure which quantifies the interconnection in the network is the clustering 
coefficient. It measures the local connectivity in the network (i.e., indicating to what extent the 
neighbours of a node are interconnected). For node vi with degree ki, the maximum number of 
possible edges among its neighbours is ki(ki-1). The clustering coefficient is the portion of these 
possible edges that indeed exist and is computed as:  
 𝐶𝑖 =
|[𝑟,𝑠]|
𝑘𝑖(𝑘𝑖−1)
  (2-11) 
if edge [vr, vs] exists, and both nodes vr and vs are also connected to node vi, then we have |[𝑟,𝑠]| 
= 1. 
 
Coreness Centrality 
Recently, Kitsak et al. (Kitsak et al., 2010)  argued that the position of a node is more 
effective than its degree. Specifically, the nodes located at the core part of a network, are more 
influential compared to the nodes in the periphery. Coreness of a node can be procured by using 
the k-core decomposition  (Dorogovtsev et al., 2006) that repetitively decomposes the network 
according to the nodes residual degree. To calculate coreness, one needs global topological 
information of the network, which limits its usage to very large-scale networks (Lu et al., 2016). 
The k-core decomposition method applied to calculate the coreness centrality can be briefed as 
follows. Initially the nodes with degree zero are removed with Ci=0 before we begin the k-core 
decomposition. In the first step, all nodes with degree equal to 1 are removed, until no more 
nodes with degree one remain in the network. The nodes removed in this stage have the coreness 
centrality Ci=1. Likewise, in the second step, repetitively the nodes with degree equal to 2 are 
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removed, which are assigned to 2-shell and their coreness centrality is 2. This process keeps on 
going till all the nodes are removed.  
 
H-index 
H-index (Hirsch, 2005) is a local centrality in which every node only needs the degrees of its 
neighbours. H-index of a node is defined as the maximum value h such that there exist at least 
h neighbours with degrees of at least h. In this thesis, we consider the average lobby index (al-
index), which is computed as follows (Abbasi, 2013): 
 𝑎𝑙 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 =
1
ℎ
∑ 𝑘𝑗𝑗∈𝑇𝐻𝑖   (2-12) 
where THi is a set of top-h neighbours of node vi, whose degree is at least h. 
 
2.2.2 Path-Based Centralities 
The centrality measures mentioned above rely on the nodes’ local neighbourhood. 
However, when it comes to information propagation, the nodes which can transfer the data faster 
and more extensive, are more critical. We consider some centrality measures that are based on 
the length of the shortest path.  
 
Shortest Path Length 
Many of graph centrality parameters are based on shortest path length between pairs of 
nodes in the network. A path from node vi to node vj is a sequence of edges, directed or 
undirected, connecting node vi to node vj. Also, the path length is defined as the number of edges 
in the path. Now we can explain the shortest path length, dij, as the shortest path from node vi to 
node vj when node vi and the node vj are connected. The length of a path is defined as the number 
of edges included in the path. This can be simply extended to weighted networks by considering 
their weighted length. It is also known as characteristics path or geodesic path. For instance, in 
a communication network, the shortest path length is chosen for data transmission between two 
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different data centres. This problem is also known as the min-delay path problem (Wu et al., 
2013). This parameter is also applied in transportation, robotics, and VLSI design (Chen, 1996). 
Chen et al. (Chen, 1996), Ittai et al. (Abraham et al., 2010, Abraham et al., 2011), and Mohri 
(Mohri, 2002) introduced different methods to calculate the shortest path in the network. It is 
worth mentioning that the longest shortest path length in the graph is defined as the graph 
diameter. 
 
Average Path Length 
In a network consisting of N nodes, the total number of pairs of nodes is 2N (N − 1), where 
there is a distinct corresponding shortest path length between each pair of nodes. The average 
path length, L, is the average over all the shortest path lengths of these pairs across the network, 
i.e., 
 𝐿 =
1
2𝑁(𝑁−1)
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑖≠𝑗   (2-13) 
Here, L is an indication of the interconnectivity of the nodes in a network. For example, 
for a relatively large social network, L is a small value. In late 60’s, small-world experiment was 
conducted by Stanley Milgram. They examined the United States’ social network by its average 
path length and concluded that human society has the small-world property with rather short 
path length. Although this experiment often comes along with ‘six degree of separation’, 
Milgram never used this phrase himself. Milgram published the result of this experiment in 1967 
(Milgram, 1967). Later on, based on the online Facebook database, Backstrom in 2012 showed 
a 4 degree of separation (Backstrom et al., 2012), and Bhagat in 2016 showed a 3.5 degree of 
separation  (Bhagat et al., 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
22  Complex Network Models 
 
 
Closeness Centrality 
Closeness centrality quantifies how a component is in the “middle” of network, not too 
far from the centre, and is defined as the inverse of the average length of the shortest path 
between a node and the rest of nodes in the network, that is computed as: 
 𝐶𝑙𝑖 =
𝑁−1
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗≠𝑖
 (2-14) 
where Cli is the closeness centrality of node vi, and dij is the shortest path length between nodes 
vi and vj.  
Node and Edge Betweenness 
Freeman introduced the node betweenness centrality as a measure to quantify the control 
of a person on the communication between other people in a social network (Freeman, 1977a). 
According to his theory, the nodes that have a high probability of getting visited on a randomly 
picked the shortest path between a randomly chosen pair of nodes to have a high betweenness 
centrality index. This type of nodes act as the bridge for the propagation of information through 
the network and are usually essential components for it. The node betweenness centrality for 
node vi is defined as: 
 𝜌𝑖 = ∑ (𝜓𝑝𝑞(𝑖)/𝜓𝑝𝑞) 𝑖≠𝑝≠𝑞≠𝑖  (2-15) 
where ψ pq is the number of the shortest path from node vp to node vq, and ψ pq(i) is the number 
of these paths making use of node vi. It assesses how a node behaves like a bridge in the network. 
Nodes with high betweenness centrality often connect different parts of the networks. The edges 
betweenness centrality sometimes are also interpreted as their load. Betweenness centrality of 
an edge eij connecting nodes vi and vj is computed as:  
 𝜌𝑖𝑗 = ∑ (𝜓𝑝𝑞(𝑒𝑖𝑗)/𝜓𝑝𝑞)𝑝≠𝑞  (2-16) 
where ψ pq is the number of the shortest path from node vp to node vq, and ψ pq(eij) is the number 
of these paths making use of eij.  
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Information Centrality 
Another frequently considered centrality index is information centrality index that was 
introduced by Stephenson and Zelen (K. Stephenson, 1998) to quantify the nodes’ centrality in 
social networks. It is based on transferable information between any pair of nodes in a connected 
network. Introduction of this measure is motivated by the theory of statistical estimation. Here 
the term “signal” is defined as a path connecting a pair of nodes, while the variance of this signal 
is considered as “noise”. It presumes that the information will be lost during every step of 
propagation in the network, and therefore in longer routes, more information is lost. 
Accordingly, it scores the importance of a node based on the information contained in all 
possible paths between every two nodes (K. Stephenson, 1998). The quantity of data that can 
be transmitted between every two nodes vi and vj, can be quantified as a summation of 
information transmitted through every possible route between them, designated as qij. It has 
been shown that qij is equivalent to conductance in electrical grids (Altmann, 1993, Poulin et 
al., 2000) which implies that: 
 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = (𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑗𝑗 − 2𝑟𝑖𝑗)
−1  (2-17) 
with rij are the elements of the matrix: 
 𝑅 = (𝑟𝑖𝑗) = (𝐷 − 𝐴 + 𝐹)
−1 (2-18) 
where D is a diagonal matrix with nodes degrees as its diagonal elements and F is a matrix 
whose items are all one. The information index of vi is then defined as: 
 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑖 = [
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑗 ]
−1
  (2-19) 
Eigenvalue Centrality 
It has been shown that the importance of nodes obtained based on the eigenvector 
corresponding to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix A plays a role in some dynamical 
processes. Eigenvalue centrality assumes that the impact of a node is determined by both the 
number of its neighbours and the influence of each neighbour (Bonacich, 1987, Bonacich, 
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1972). The eigenvalue centrality of a node is proportional to the summation of the centralities 
of its neighbours (Bonacich, 2007). The importance of a node vi, denoted by xi, is defined as 
 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑐 ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  (2-20) 
where c is a proportionality constant. Generally, c = 1/λ where λ is the largest eigenvalue of the 
adjacency matrix A. Let’s define m(v) as the signed component of the maximal magnitude of 
vector v, i.e. m(v)=|v|. Let’s consider x (0) as an arbitrary vector. For k ≥ 1, repeatedly compute 
x (k) = x (k−1)A; normalize x (k) = x (k)/m(x (k) ); until the desired precision is achieved. 
 
Page Rank 
PageRank algorithm (Brin and Page, 1998) is a popular variant of eigenvector centrality 
and is used to rank websites in Google search engine and other commercial scenarios (Langville 
and Meyer, 2011). The traditional keyword-based websites ranking algorithms are vulnerable 
to malicious attacks, which improves the influence of a website by increasing the density of 
irrelevant keywords. PageRank distinguishes the importance of different websites by random 
walking on the network constructed from the relationships of web pages. Similar to eigenvector 
centrality, PageRank supposes that the significance of a web page is determined by the quantity 
as well as the quality of the pages linked to it. Initially, each node (i.e. page) gets one-unit PR 
value. Then, every node evenly distributes the PR value to its neighbours along with its outgoing 
links. Mathematically, the PR value of node vi at t step is  
 𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑑𝑗
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1   (2-21) 
with N being the total number of nodes in the network, and 𝑑𝑗
𝑜𝑢𝑡 is the out-degree of node vj. 
The above iteration will stop if the PR values of all nodes reach a steady-state. A significant 
drawback of the above random walk process is that the PR value of a dangling node (the node 
with zero out-degree) cannot be redistributed, and then equation 2-21 cannot guarantee the 
convergence (there are some other cases where equation 2-21 will not converge (Boccaletti et 
al., 2006)). To solve these problems, a random jumping factor was introduced by assuming that 
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the web surfer will browse the web pages along the links with probability s, and leave the current 
page and open a random page with probability 1− s. Accordingly, equation 2-21 is modified as  
 𝑃𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑠 ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑑𝑗
𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1  + (1 − 𝑠)  
1
𝑛
  (2-22) 
 
2.2.3 Flow-Based Centrality (Ford-Fulkerson Algorithm)  
To calculate the load of each transmission line in power systems, the analytical tool we 
apply is Ford-Fulkerson method (Ford and Fulkerson, 1956b, Dwivedi and Yu, 2013). Let us 
assume G as a directed weighted network. Any transmission line’s load is proportional to its 
admittance as I = VY with I, V and Y representing the current, bus voltage, the bus admittance 
matrix. Hence, to evaluate the capability of a link to carry the power flow, it needs to be weighted 
by its admittance. One can then find the overall power flow from the source nodes (generators) 
to sink ones (loads). Here, we apply the Ford–Fulkerson maximum-flow min-cut theorem to 
determine the maximum flow through the network. This theorem implies that the maximum-
flow is equal to the sum of flows across “minimum cut” edges set operating at their maximum 
flow (Ford and Fulkerson, 1956b, Freeman et al., 1991). 
Suppose the link e1 connects nodes vi and vj. For a network with m sources and n sinks, we 
define 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑢𝑣  as the maximum flow from the source u to the sink v and fij as the proportion of this 
flow passing from e1. Then, a flow-based centrality index is defined as (Freeman et al., 1991, 
Dwivedi and Yu, 2013): 
 𝐿𝑖𝑗 = ∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑢𝑣𝑛
𝑣=1
𝑚
𝑢=1  (2-23) 
Lij is indeed the load of the link between nodes vi and vj. To normalise these weights, we simply 
divide them by the total fmax, as 
 ?̅?𝑖𝑗 =
∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑖𝑗
𝑢𝑣  𝑛𝑣=1
𝑚
𝑢=1
∑ ∑ 𝑓𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑢𝑣  𝑛𝑣=1
𝑚
𝑢=1
 (2-24) 
 
  
 
26  Complex Network Models 
 
 
  
Note that the input to the Ford-Fulkerson maximum flow algorithm is the weighted 
adjacency matrix of the power grid, where the link weights are the admittance values. The output 
of this algorithm is another weighted matrix representing the maximum flow for the links. This 
matrix can be used to rank the edges based on the load they carry and thus identifying the most 
vulnerable edges. As the flow passing through an edge increases, its weights will also increase. 
Fig. 2.8 shows the flow distribution for a sample network with two sources and three sinks. The 
initial admittances of the links are shown in Fig. 2.8a and the normalised centrality indices 
obtained according to the above method are shown in Fig. 2.8b. 
 
2.3    Complex Network Models of Power Grids 
Complex network theory is interested in the characteristic properties of various complex 
networks and their general analysis methods. One major branch of this theory is the relationship 
between the topology of the complex network and its performance. The literature is divided into 
two main categories where some paid attention to detailed modelling of subsystems while some 
others worked on the overall structure of the complex networks. A detailed network model is a 
fundamental tool to understand and explore the relationship between the topological 
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Fig. 2. 8 Ford-Fulkerson based centrality index in a multiple source and sink network (2 sources and 3 sinks) 
 (a) a power system with lines’ admittances on edges (b) the same power system showing Ford-Fulkerson 
based centrality indices, as calculated by equation 2-24 
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characteristics and the performance of power systems. Mainly, appropriate models of power 
systems can be applied for testing the control or planning strategies, conducting sensitivity 
analysis for cascade mitigation and also examining possible scaling by generalising structural 
metrics. 
A significant part of this thesis focuses on the structural analysis of power systems, 
especially for a chain reaction and failure propagation in their components for mitigation of 
cascade failures. Hence, in this section, we review the essential complex network models of 
power systems.  
 
2.3.1 Minimum-distance graph  
This model aims to generate an undirected graph with the structural properties similar to 
that of power systems. In the minimum distance method, to connect any pair of nodes, the cost 
of their distance is taken into consideration. Let’s define ψi as the set of neighbours for node vi 
and N and E as the number of desired nodes and edges, respectively. First, using a uniform 
distribution, a random coordinate for each node vi is generated as vi (xi, yi) where xi and yi are 
the coordinates along x and y axes. Then, int(E/N) number of edges [i,j] between nodes vi and vj 
is created such that the Euclidean distance between them is minimised: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑣𝑗
(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗)
2 + (𝑦𝑖 − 𝑦𝑗)
2
𝑠. 𝑡 𝑣𝑗 ∉  𝜓𝑖
                                            (2 − 25) 
with int(.) being the floor value function. The minimisation can be achieved using the random 
walk through any possible route with the above property and comparing the computation results 
of equation 2-25. Finally, an additional edge is generated with the probability P= E/N - int(E/N). 
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2.3.2 Synthetic Spatial Power Network  
One of the essential traits of real-world power networks that were neglected in most 
studies is their spatial constraints (Barthélemy, 2011). Indeed, power networks are spatially 
extended systems and geographical location of the nodes play essential roles in their 
connections. Spatial networks show significantly distinct behaviour compared to most of the 
spatially unrestricted networks (Asztalos et al., 2014). Since none of the methods in the literature 
can model the power systems accurately; especially most of them ignore their physical 
properties, in this section, we introduce a synthetic model to construct a spatially extended 
power network with the source, sink and intermediate nodes. Similar to real power systems, the 
synthetic model network is also a directed network with flow from the source (generator) to sink 
(load) nodes. As a spatial network, generators are more likely to feed the loads in their 
neighbourhood. Likewise, loads are connected to their upstream buses nearby. Not to mention 
that if busbar vj is fed by busbar vi, then vi is upstream busbar for vj. To have more realistic measures 
and stronger analogous parameters, we generate a synthetic power network with 118 buses 
consisting of 91 loads, 19 generators, and 196 lines similar to IEEE 118 bus test set. These 118 
buses are randomly distributed in a 118 by 118 plane. Also, 19 generators and 91 loads are 
randomly distributed on 118 buses as well as intermediate buses. We consider a circle with 
radius r around each node (rg: the radius around generators, ri: radius for intermediate buses, 
and rl: radius for loads) to connect with others in this circle with probability p. Based on these 
considerations, we assume the connectivity radius for generators as rg = 15, for intermediate 
buses as ri = 20, and for loads as rl = 25. We also fix the connection probability at P = 0.4. Fig. 
2.9 shows a synthetic spatial power model for 118 buses and 19 generators. Also, to have similar 
weights in random power network and IEEE 118 bus system, we generate the weights of the 
model network (admittances) according to a normal distribution with the mean value and 
standard deviation of IEEE 118 bus system.  
Table. 2.1 shows the comparison between IEEE 118 bus system and the synthetic model 
parameters where the similarity between these two complex networks are quantified.  
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Table. 2.  1 Comparison of structural properties of IEEE 118 bus and synthetic model 
Feature/Test Case IEEE 118 Bus Synthetic Model 
No. of nodes 118 118 
No. of edges 179 196 
Network Density 0.0259 0.0283 
Average Path Length 6.308 5.704 
Average Degree <k> 3.033 3.220 
Efficiency 0.210 0.209 
Clustering Coefficient 0.165 0.158 
Assortativity -0.1525 -0.145 
 
 
Fig. 2. 9 synthetic spatial network constructed by the model introduced in section 2.3.2 
Red circles: Generators and blue triangles: Loads connected directly with intermediate buses or generators 
 
2.3.3 AC/DC Model 
By studying the power flow in power systems, we aim to calculate the value of power in 
the transmission lines. To do so, we need to consider the actual variations in power system 
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parameters like voltages, currents and the topology of the network. Also, it should comply with 
the physical laws and constraints like Kirchhoff’s laws and Ohm’s law. Based on these 
realisations, in this section, the AC and DC, power flow methods, applied in power systems 
engineering are described. 
 
AC Model 
Studying the AC load flow in a power system enables us to calculate the magnitude and 
the angle of the busbar voltages given the load specification and the generators real power, P, 
and the voltage situation (Grainger and Stevenson, 1994). By knowing these data, active and 
reactive power at each transmission line as well as the generator output reactive power can be 
calculated. Since the nature of such a problem is nonlinear; the numerical methods should be 
applied for solving it. This method is only valid in the steady-state of the power systems when 
there is no transition in power system parameters like the loads’ value, generated power, and 
frequency.  
To begin the formulation, let us model the busbar vi with a node at which the voltage is Vi 
= |Vi| ∠Vi, where |Vi| is the voltage magnitude, and ∠Vi is the voltage phase angle. Likewise, 
Vk = |Vk| ∠Vk is the voltage at busbar k. Also, the phase difference between nodes vi and vk, is 
defined by θik = θi − θk=∠Vi -∠Vk. Likewise, a transmission line eik connecting two busbars vi 
and vk, can be modelled as a link eik connecting corresponding nodes vi and vk. In this link, the 
current can be evaluated as Iik = (Vi − Vk)(Gik + jBik), with Bik and Gik being the susceptance and 
conductance of line eik, respectively. Thus, the injected power to node vi via the transmission 
line eik is  
 𝑆𝑖𝑘 = 𝑉𝑘𝐼𝑖𝑘 = 𝑃𝑖𝑘 + 𝑄𝑖𝑘 (2-26) 
where Pik and Qik are the active and reactive powers respectively. Pik and Qik can also be restated 
as: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑘 =  |𝑉𝑖|
2𝐺𝑖𝑘 − |𝑉𝑖||𝑉𝑘|(𝐺𝑖𝑘 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑘 + 𝐵𝑖𝑘 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑘) (2-27) 
 𝑄𝑖𝑘 = |𝑉𝑖|
2𝐵𝑖𝑘 + |𝑉𝑖||𝑉𝑘|(𝐺𝑖𝑘 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑘 − 𝐵𝑖𝑘 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑘) (2-28) 
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For busbar vi, the injected power is defined as Si = Pi − jQi, with Pi and Qi being the active 
and reactive powers.  
Since the injected power to busbar vi via the transmission lines is zero-sum, two following 
equations can describe the active and reactive power in it: 
𝑃𝑖 = − ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1 = ∑ |𝑉𝑖||𝑉𝑘|(𝐺𝑖𝑘 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑘 + 𝐵𝑖𝑘 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑘)
𝑁
𝑘=1  (2-29) 
𝑄𝑖 = − ∑ 𝑄𝑖𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1 = ∑ |𝑉𝑖||𝑉𝑘|(𝐺𝑖𝑘 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑘 − 𝐵𝑖𝑘 cos 𝜃𝑖𝑘)
𝑁
𝑘=1  (2-30) 
where 𝐺𝑖𝑖 = − ∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑘𝑖≠𝑘  and 𝐵𝑖𝑖 = − ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑘𝑖≠𝑘 . In case there is no immediate link between nodes 
vi and vk, Gik = Bik = 0. 
Here, we define the known and unknown parameters of the power system which depend 
on the type of busbars. If there is a generator connected to a busbar, it is identified as the 
Generator busbar, otherwise it is a Load busbar. Just one exception is that one of the Generator 
busbars is selected arbitrarily as the reference bus named slack busbar. In Load busbars, the 
active power PD and reactive power QD are known values. Hence, we call them PQ busbars. 
Likewise, for Generator busbars, the active power PG and the voltage magnitude |VG| are known. 
So, they are called PG busbars. Also, for the slack busbar, the voltage magnitude |VS| and the 
voltage phase θS = ∠VS are considered as known parameters. Therefore, the voltage magnitude 
and phase for the Load busbars, and also the voltage angle for the generator busbars should be 
treated as unknowns. There is no unknown value for the slack bus as it is the reference busbar. 
For a system having N busbars and R generators, the number of unknowns is 2(N-1) - (R-1), 
thus there should be the same number of independent equations. 
Several algorithms have been proposed to solve the load flow equations, such as the 
Newton-Raphson method, the Gauss-Seidel method and the Fast-decoupled load flow method. 
 
DC Model 
Although the AC power flow algorithm can be the most accurate method for calculating 
the power flow across the grid in the steady-state, it is computationally costly especially when 
it is supposed to solve a large-scale power system. In this case, large-scale nonlinear equations 
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should be solved iteratively at each time step till all the parameters converge to their static 
values. As stated in the previous section, large-scale nonlinear equations should be solved 
iteratively at each time step until all of the parameters converge to their static values. Therefore, 
a linearised version of AC power flow algorithm can be used instead. To do so, some 
assumptions (Mei et al., 2011) are made: 
1. The resistance of each line is much smaller than its reactance (RL << XL). Thus, we 
neglect the grid losses, and the line parameters can be rewritten as: 
 𝐺𝐿 =
𝑅𝐿
𝑅𝐿
2+𝑋𝐿
2 ≈ 0  (2-31) 
 𝐵𝐿 =
−𝑋𝐿
𝑅𝐿
2+𝑋𝐿
2 ≈
−1
𝑋𝐿
    (2-32) 
 𝑍𝐿 ≈ 𝑗. 𝑋𝐿 , 𝑌𝐿 ≈ 𝑗. 𝐵𝐿   (2-33) 
2. There is almost a flat profile for all busbar voltages across the power grid, i.e. the voltage 
magnitude in per-unit system is equal for all busbars:  |𝑉𝑖|  ≈ 1 𝑝. 𝑢.   
3. The phase difference between two connected busbars is negligible. This assumption will 
lead to the linearization of sine and cosine terms in the original model: 
 sin(𝜃𝑖𝑘) = sin(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑘) ≈  𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑘 (2-34) 
 cos(𝜃𝑖𝑘) = cos(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑘) ≈ 1 (2-35) 
Now the equation 2-24 can be restated as:  
 𝑃𝑖𝑘 =  −(𝐵𝑖𝑘 sin 𝜃𝑖𝑘) ≈   −𝐵𝑖𝑘 (𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑘) (2-36) 
which implies that according to the equation 2-26, for each bus:  
 𝑃𝑖 = − ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1 = ∑ 𝐵𝑖𝑘 (𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃𝑘)
𝑁
𝑘=1  (2-37) 
which is the nodal equation for the busbar vi. The matrix format of this equation would be:  
 𝑃 = 𝐵𝜃 (2-38) 
with 𝑃 = [𝑃1    𝑃2 … 𝑃𝑁]
𝑇, 𝜃 = [𝜃1    𝜃2 … 𝜃𝑁]
𝑇 and B being an N × N matrix containing the 
transmission line’s admittance. To solve these equations, the consumption load in Load busbars 
and also the generated active power in Generator busbars are needed. Due to the fact that in DC 
model the line resistance is neglected, there would be no RI2 loss in the system. Hence, it is 
called lossless. Therefore, the sum of the consumed power is equal to the amount of the 
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generated power. Thus, for a power system having N busbars, the power injected for N-1 nodes 
and also the voltage phase for the reference busbar is needed. 
 
2.4    Benchmark Networks 
In this section, various benchmark networks applied for simulation in future chapters are 
summarised. First, node vitality measures are examined on benchmark networks.  
Benchmark networks consist of both synthetic and real networks. As synthetic networks, 
we use BA, WS and ER networks, which are explained in section 2.1. Studying model networks 
can provide insights on how real networks behave; however, they might not capture all 
properties of real networks. Thus, here several real networks are also studied.  
 
Table. 2.  2 Structural features of the studied real networks 
 N: number of nodes, E: number of edges, <d>: average degree, APL: average path length, 
 CC̅̅̅̅ : global clustering coefficient, Efficiency: global efficiency of the network 
Network/Parameter N E <d> APL 𝐶𝐶̅̅̅̅  Efficiency 
Australia power grid 1130 1426 2.5221 12.3545 0.0768 0.00112 
US Power Grid 4941 6594 2.6690   18.9891  0.1031   0.00027 
European Power Grid 1494 2156 2.8862 18.8847 0.0947 0.00096 
UK Power Grid 327 407 2.4892 12.9994 0.0677 0.00381 
IEEE 300-Bus 300 409 2.7266 9.9353 0.0960 0.00455 
French Power Grid 146 223 3.0547 6.6081 0.2601 0.01051 
IEEE 118-Bus System 118 179 3.0338 6.3087 0.1355 0.01294 
Spanish Power Grid 98 175 3.5714 4.9168 0.3532 0.01842 
Internet Autonomous 3233 5773 3.5712 3.7624 0.0152 0.00055 
Melbourne Natural Water 2145 2644 2.4652 16.8134 0.0922 0.00057 
Melbourne Roads Grid 1830 2678 2.9267 7.6054 0.0469 0.00082 
Us Airports Network 1574 17215 21.8742 3.1151 0.3841 0.00695 
 
We consider eight power networks including Australian high voltage power grid, Western 
US power system, European power network, UK, French and Spanish power systems, IEEE 300 
Bus and 118 Bus benchmark networks. We also study some other real networks, including the 
Internet in the level of the Autonomous system, US Airport network, Melbourne road network 
and Melbourne water networks. Table. 2.2 represents the structural features of the real networks 
considered in this work.  
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Table. 2.  3 Demographic information of the real networks under consideration.  
N: number of nodes, E: number of edges 
Networks N E 
Synthetic 
ER 200 983 
WS 200 1000 
BA 200 975 
Power Grid 
Spanish Power Grid 98 175 
French Power Grid 146 223 
UK Power Grid 327 407 
Australian Power Grid 1130 1426 
Biological 
Macaque Cortical Network 71 438 
Cat Cortex Network 95 1170 
C. elegans Network 297 2359 
Real (Infrastructure) 
US Airports 332 2126 
Melbourne Natural Water 2145 2644 
Melbourne Roads 1830 2678 
 
In the following chapters, cascade propagation methodology is applied on some synthetic 
networks as well as real-world networks ranging from biological networks to road networks, 
from power grids to airport and natural water distribution network. Table. 2.3 briefs the number 
of nodes and edges in the network under consideration. To examine the power system 
vulnerability against cascade failure, both real and synthetic model networks are applied. As a 
real network, we consider IEEE 118 bus network (Chen and McCalley, 2005, Machowski et al., 
2011), consisting of 19 generators, 9 transformers, 186 lines and 91 loads as shown in Fig. 2.10.  
We also introduce a synthetic model to construct a spatially extended power network with 
the source, sink and intermediate nodes which is explained in section.2.3.2. We apply the load 
reduction algorithm on IEEE 57 bus network, which consists of 7 generators, 80 lines and 42 
loads and is shown in Fig. 2.11. The IEEE 57 busbar test case is a representation of a section of 
the American Electric Power Grid (in the Midwestern US) in the 1960s.  
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Fig. 2. 10 IEEE 118 bus system used in this work as a benchmark network. This figure has been adopted from (Lu, 2008). 
 
Fig. 2. 11 IEEE 57 test case consisting of 57 buses, 80 lines and 42 loads 
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Fig. 2. 12 Degree histogram of the networks considered in this work.  
It consists four power grids (Australian, US, French and IEEE 300 bus networks) and four real networks (US Airport, Melbourne 
water, cat cortex and Melbourne roads networks ) 
 
In fig. 2.12, the degree distribution of four power systems (Australian, US, French and 
IEEE 300 bus networks) as well as four other real networks (US Airport, Melbourne water, cat 
cortex and Melbourne roads networks) are depicted. Generally, in power networks, there are not 
any high connected busbars (nodes), whereas in some other real networks like US Airport and 
Melbourne roads networks there are plenty of hubs. 
  
 
2.4 Benchmark Networks  37 
 
 
2.5    Conclusion 
In this chapter, the complex network fundamentals, models, and structural centralities 
were reviewed. When it comes to model complex networks such as power systems, synthetic 
models are advantageous candidates. Three different synthetic models, i.e. ER, WS, and BA 
models, and the methods to generate them along with their properties were discussed.  
Then, the structural centralities of complex networks were explained. We can assign a 
score to any component in a complex network, e.g. nodes or edges using centrality measures. 
Structural centralities can be categorized into three main groups: centralities based on the local 
neighbourhood which only takes the nodes’ neighbours into consideration, path-based 
centralities which concentrate on the information flow in the network. It means the components 
which appear more in information transfer across the network, get higher centrality values.  
Finally, flow-based centrality was reviewed which mainly applies the very well-known 
Maximum-flow based Ford-Fulkerson method to compute the load of each component in power 
system. 
Afterwards, the complex networks models of power grids which can be adopted to mimic 
the power systems behaviours were reviewed. In minimum-distance method, a cost function is 
evaluated to connect any two nodes.  
In some cases, to confirm a proposed analytic method and its results on a real complex 
network, another similar network is necessary to conduct the same analysis. This twin network 
with similar structural properties can hardly be found in real-world in many cases. Hence, we 
try to generate them using synthetic networks generation methods. In the case of power 
networks, we introduced the synthetic spatial power network which considers the power grids 
physical properties like their spatial extension while connecting the busbars. Besides, it assumed 
that there are different types of nodes in the network, e.g. in power system case, we have 
generators, intermediate and load nodes in the model.  
AC power system load flow analysis is a complicated and also more accurate method for 
computing the power system’s parameters compared to other methods in the expense of costly 
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calculation and divergence risk, which can be traded off by using its approximation DC load 
flow. In the next chapter, the cascade failure phenomenon in complex networks and also in the 
power system as a specific complex network is studied. 
 
   
Chapter 3 
 
CASCADE FAILURES 
 
 
3.1    Introduction 
Power grids, road networks, airports, water distribution infrastructures and the Internet 
are examples of critical networks playing essential roles in modern communities. Their 
proper functioning and resiliency are of extreme importance. Such critical networks might 
be subject to failures in their components (nodes/edges). Errors (i.e., random failure) and 
attacks (i.e., intentional failures) have been studied in complex networks (Albert et al., 2000, 
Mirzasoleiman and Jalili, 2011, Jalili, 2011, Perc, 2009). It has been shown that the 
resiliency of complex networks against errors and attacks depends on their structure. For 
example, scale-free networks – which are characterised by heavy-tailed degree distribution 
– are fragile to attacks, while being resilient against errors (Albert et al., 2000). Networks 
with more homogeneous degree distribution (e.g., random networks) behave similarly 
against degree-based errors and attacks. 
In some cases, a more catastrophic situation can happen, and a failure in one 
component may propagate through the network resulting in failing some other components. 
It is worth mentioning that the cascade failure proceeds based on load redistribution in the 
network and components’ individual parameters do not significantly affect it. This is referred 
to as cascade failure in the literature (Crucitti et al., 2004a, Wang et al., 2008, Li et al., 2012, 
Simonsen et al., 2008). Such cascade failures were responsible for large-scale blackouts in 
power grids (Buldyrev et al., 2010). Power grids can be modelled as networked structures 
with generators, loads and transformers as nodes and wirings as links. Any failures in one of 
the network components may give rise to an overload in other components and as a result a 
failure in them. Such failures can pervade the network and result in a cascade failure process 
(Ren and Dobson, 2008, Crucitti et al., 2004a, Jalili, 2015), which can, in turn lead the whole 
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or a fundamental part of the network to crash. In next section, the process of cascade failure 
will be discussed in detail. 
 
3.2    The Process of Cascade Failures 
Cascade failures have been frequently reported in real networks (Xu and Wang, 2005, 
Kinney et al., 2005). They are often responsible for large-scale blackouts in power systems. 
In this section, we review a widely-studied process (Mirzasoleiman et al., 2011) applied in 
cascade failures analysis in a complex network.  
Network components (nodes/edges) might undergo random failure and targeted 
attacks. In some cases, this could lead to a cascade of failures in the network, where a failure 
might trigger a failure(s) in other components. The cascade failure process is as follows. 
Initially, a set of components (nodes/edges) fail due to an overload, cyber-attack or possibly 
any other malfunction in the protection system. To compensate for the flow shortage caused 
by this failure and keep the information or power flowing in the network, the loads on 
impacted components are redistributed through the network. In other words, as the initial 
failure happens, the failed edge(s) are removed from the network, and the load redistribution 
algorithm is applied on the modified network to calculate the new loads for components. 
Here, we assume that each edge eij has bounded capacity Cij, demonstrating the maximum 
load which can be delivered by the edge. Hence, those lines loaded higher than their capacity 
are overloaded, and thus removed from the network. We suppose that Cij is proportional to 
its initial load Wij, (Cij = TWij), where T > 1 is the capacity parameter (Mirzasoleiman et al., 
2011, Wang and Chen, 2008) and the initial loads for all the edges are calculated at the outset. 
As T increases, the network becomes more tolerant, and the failures have less impact on that. 
Often, for any edge, there exists a constant threshold value Tc > 1 such that if additional load 
is larger than its capacity, then the edge cannot tolerate the increased flow. A phase transition 
occurs at this critical point, and the network faces further redistribution of the flows. 
Consequently, more edges might break down and this process will keep running till every 
remaining edges’ load gets less than its capacity.  This process continues until no further 
edge is removed from the network, i.e. no edge is overloaded as a result of load 
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redistribution. Such a cascade failure process might lead to failures in a large number of the 
links, and thus large-scale blackout in power grids. A pseudo-code of the cascade failure 
process is shown in Procedure 3.1.  
 
Fig. 3. 1 Cascade failure process in IEEE 30 Bus network 
The capacity parameter is set to T = 1 for simplicity. (a) The original network working normally with the link width 
proportional to their load, (b) initially, node 6 (shown in grey) is removed, (c) the overall load is redistributed through the 
network and as a result of overloading in some edges and their removal, the isolated nodes which (shown in red) are 
removed, (d) further load redistribution happens in the network and (e) node 21 gets removed, (f) Finally, in the equilibrium 
point, the cascade stops, and no edge is removed. 
 
 
It should be noticed that two load redistribution methods are applied in this work: edge 
betweenness (defined by equation (2-16)) and maximum-flow based method (defined by 
equation (2-24)). 
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Procedure 3.1: Cascade Failure Procedure 
Given a connected graph G = (N, E), a threshold value T, and an initial edge 
failure e0 event: 
 1: For each edge ek ∈ E connecting nodes vi and vj 
 
2: 
 Calculate the initial load in ek (Lij)  
Initially Cij= Lij 
 3: (G- e0) →G remove e0 from the graph 
 4: For each remaining edge ek ∈ E 
 5:  Calculate Lij  
 6:  If Lij /Cij > T  
 7:   (G- ek) →G  
 8:  Repeat 4 until no edge gets removed, and the cascade stops 
 9: Return G  
 
 In Fig. 3.1, the process of cascade failure in IEEE benchmark 30-bus network is 
displayed. At the beginning (a), the network is working normally in steady-state and all the 
nodes in the network are connected through edges. Not to mention that the thickness of the 
edges is proportional to their capacity. Initial failure is planted on node 6 which makes that 
node and all edges connected to it get removed from the network (b). Because of change in 
the network structure, the flow of power is redistributed in the network and every overloaded 
edge is removed from the network (c). This procedure keeps going (d, e) until no more edge 
gets overloaded and removed. At this stage cascade stops and the network reaches to another 
steady-state (f). 
 
3.3    Cascade Failure Models in Complex Networks 
It has always been crucial for scholars to understand the way complex networks behave 
during a cascade of failures; especially the mechanism of cascade spreading throughout the 
complex networks is very important. To do so, many researchers preferred to study the 
cascade by considering the macroscopic parameters of a number of complex networks such 
as power systems, whereas; some others decided to investigate the microscopic component 
properties. One of the major branches in this area is to find out the role of structural 
vulnerability in the spreading of a cascade in complex networks. Among a number of models 
introduced for studying the cascade failures, some only investigated the static structural 
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models which are not that successful in explaining the real behaviour of power systems. On 
the other hand, there are some dynamic models trying to comprehensively describe the 
complex networks; for example, in power system case, both slow dynamics evolvements 
like network augmentation and upgrades as well as the fast dynamics like short circuits or 
any unanticipated faults.  
In this section, different cascade models for the complex networks are explained. First, the 
structural models are studied consisting of static, Motter-Lai and Effective Efficiency 
models. Following that, the component cascading failure dependent models are reviewed. 
This category consists of CASCADE model and branching process model.  
 
3.3.1 Structural Models 
The structural models characterise the macroscopic attributes of complex networks. 
They apply topological properties of the complex networks to measure their vulnerability to 
multiple attack scenarios and evaluate their resiliency against cascade failures (Holme, 2002, 
Holme et al., 2002, Motter and Lai, 2002, Wang et al., 2008, Crucitti et al., 2004a, Holme 
and Kim, 2002). There are three major structural models; the static model, Motter-Lai and 
effective efficiency models. These models are further described in the following sections. 
 
Static Model 
The first and less complicated cascade model for complex networks is the static model 
of network vulnerability to failures or attacks. In this model, the cascade is mainly triggered 
by the removal of a single or multiple components, nodes or edges, from the network which 
may lead to dysfunction of the total network. After some chain reactions in the network and 
removal of more components, the failure stops. Then, to quantify the extremity of the 
destruction, the remaining network is compared with the original network. Here, some 
metrics have been proposed to measure the severity of the damage. For instance, Crucitti et 
al. (Crucitti et al., 2005) applied the network global efficiency E(G) as an indication of the 
effectiveness of the connections in the network.  
 𝐸(𝐺) =
1
𝑁(𝑁−1)
∑
1
𝑑𝑖𝑗
 𝑖≠𝑗∈𝐺  (3-1) 
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with dij being the shortest path length between nodes vi and vj. The lower the proportion of 
global efficiency of the network after and before the attack is, the more vulnerable the power 
system is to the cascade of failures. Also, Albert and Solé  (Albert et al., 2004, Solé et al., 
2008a) proposed that the largest connected component can successfully quantify the 
extremity of the attack on the network.  
To study the effect of removing a single edge, eij, Mirzasoleiman et al. (Mirzasoleiman 
et al., 2011) calculated the number of broken edges, sij, which can be interpreted as the 
normalised avalanche sizes after the cascade process is stopped. Then, they proposed the 
Normalized average size of the removed edges (SN) which is the expected value of the 
normalised avalanche sizes (sij) corresponding to each edge eij removal. 
 𝑆𝑁 =
∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖
𝐸
 (3-2) 
To capture the dynamical properties of complex networks and discover the procedure 
of cascade propagation through these systems, a number of dynamical models have been 
introduced. Here, we summarise these dynamical models used for studying the cascade 
mechanism of complex networks.     
 
Motter-Lai Model 
To consider the dynamics of the networks, Motter and Lai (Motter and Lai, 2002) 
introduced a model to explain the procedure of cascade failure in complex networks using 
discrete-time, step-by-step, analysis method. Suppose that in a network with the 
representative graph G, at each time step one unit of energy is transferred between each pair 
of nodes through the shortest path connecting them. Now, the load of each node can be 
defined as the total number of shortest paths making use of that node (Newman, 2001, Goh 
et al., 2001, Holme and Kim, 2002) i.e. the node’s betweenness. The maximum load a node 
can handle is defined as the node capacity. Since in real networks constructed by humans, 
the capacity is limited by the budget; naturally it is assumed that the capacity Cj of node vj 
is a multiple of its load Lj. 
 𝐶𝑗 = (1 + 𝑇)𝐿𝑗(0)  (3-3) 
  
 
3.3 Cascade Failure Models in Complex Networks 45 
 
 
where T > 0 is a tolerance parameter, and Lj(0) is the initial load of node vj with the complex 
network being in its normal mode. 
In this model, the initial failure is planted in the network by removal of a single node. 
This failure changes the structure of the network and the way the shortest paths are 
distributed, which in turn might lead to overload and failure of other nodes. This procedure 
of node removal and load redistribution goes on until no node is overloaded. Now the 
damage can be measured by the size of the giant component, the largest connected 
component, which is quantified relative to the number of nodes in the network before node 
removal (N). This algorithm was applied to Western America power system, and the authors 
concluded that the attack based on the nodes’ load makes more severe damage than the 
degree-based attack (Motter and Lai, 2002). Problem with this model is that in reality, the 
power between any pair of nodes does not necessarily flow in the shortest path between 
them, which is a structural parameter. Instead, according to Kirchhoff’s law, the physics of 
the power system and parameters like the impedance and admittance, determine the path and 
amount of the power flow between nodes. 
  
Effective Efficiency Model 
Crucitti et al. (Crucitti et al., 2004a) proposed a method to transform the networks to 
a weighted, undirected graph, G, where the weights on edges are allocated by the parameter 
called effective efficiency. G is described by an N×N adjacency matrix. If there is an edge 
eij between nodes vi and vj, there will be a real number in the range (0,1] attached to that 
element in the adjacency matrix. This number is a representative of flow efficiency between 
nodes vi and vj. Initially, for all existing edges, we have eij = 1, then the time evolution 
procedure is conducted to emulate the flow redistribution dynamic after a node removal. The 
algorithm assumes that the flows between a pair of nodes using the most efficient path 
linking them. For each path, the efficiency is defined as the superposition of effective 
efficiencies of all links forming that path. 
The load of node vi, displayed by Li(t), is defined as the number of the most efficient 
paths making use of that node at time t (Goh et al., 2001). The capacity of each node, Ci, is 
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the highest load it can handle which is assumed to be proportional to its initial load Li(0) 
(Motter and Lai, 2002).   
 𝐶𝑖 =   𝑇. 𝐿𝑖(0) (3-4) 
Parameter T is the tolerance parameter in the network. The evolution happens at each time 
step.  Another feasible assumption which brings up the same results is to set: 
 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑇. 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗𝐿𝑗(0), ∀𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁  (3-5) 
When a node is removed, due to a change in the structure of the network, the most 
efficient paths between pairs of nodes and also the load distribution is changed which might 
lead to an overload in some nodes. If the load in the node vi is less than its capacity Ci, its 
efficiency remains unchanged. Otherwise, the effective efficiencies for all the links 
connected to the node vi will be derated as the following iterative rule at time t: 
 𝑒𝑖𝑗(𝑡) = {
𝑒𝑖𝑗(0)
𝐶𝑖
𝐿𝑖(𝑡)
      𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) >  𝐶𝑖
𝑒𝑖𝑗(0)                𝑖𝑓 𝐿𝑖(𝑡) ≤  𝐶𝑖
 (3-6) 
with eij (0) being the initial efficiency of edge connecting nodes vi and vj. After the initial 
node failure in the network, the iterative rule presented in equation 3-6, will be kicked off 
and iterated until the network reaches a steady state. As an indication for the severity of 
cascade failures, the most efficient paths will be averaged. The authors summarised that the 
removal of highly loaded nodes could lead to a severe cascade of failure which in turn leads 
to a catastrophic collapse across the complex network (Crucitti et al., 2004a).  
Despite two latter models, Motter-Lai and the effective efficiency models, intend to 
study the dynamics of the networks, the flow redistribution algorithm in both cases, fail to 
capture the electrical parameters of power systems, since they only consider the structural 
parameters of the networks. Some other inaccurate works were conducted in Wang and Rong 
(2009) where a load of the failed node is distributed amongst its neighbours or in (Yagan, 
2015) after a line removal, its load is equally dispatched across the network lines. 
 
3.3.2 Component Cascading Failures Dependent Model 
The second category of cascade models is the component cascading failures, including 
the CASCADE model (Dobson et al., 2007, Dobson et al., 2003, Dobson et al., 2005b) for 
transferring load and the model for the branching process (Dobson et al., 2004, Dobson et 
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al., 2005a, Dobson, 2004). In these models, no specific structure of complex networks is 
taken into consideration. Instead, the cascade of failure happens as a result of overloading, 
which in turn leads to component failures in complex networks.  
 
CASCADE Model 
Here, the fundamentals of the CASCADE model is described. Suppose that the 
network has N identical components, which initially work on steady-state and are loaded by 
independent load values L1, L2, …, LN, chosen randomly from the range [Lmin, Lmax]. Then, a 
disturbance D is applied indiscriminately on all the loads in the network. Every component 
whose load is more prominent than its threshold fails and its load is redistributed among 
other components, which are working normally. Sometimes this procedure may yield a 
cascade of failures. In a study (Dobson et al., 2005b), the procedure of cascade failures 
evolution leading to the whole complex network collapse was studied as a function of 
operational parameters like loading level. The authors found that when all the components 
are lightly loaded, the faults across the network are independent and the cascade distribution 
is exponential which means the system rarely experiences the large-scale collapse. On the 
contrary, when the loading level reaches to a critically high value, the fault shows the power-
law distribution where if the loading exceeds that threshold, large-scale collapse might be 
inevitable. Although CASCADE model simulates the overall outage, there are some 
restrictions in its assumptions since all the components are assumed to be identical and while 
redistributing the loads, it doesn’t consider the network topology.  
CASCADE model is an idealistic model of what happens during the cascade of failures as 
it ignores the network structure and how the components are connected. It also assumes that 
the faulty components make the overall load to be redistributed across the network. In real 
complex networks, however, there are a lot of dynamics and evolutions during the cascade, 
which are simply ignored in the CASCADE model. Scholars study this model as a 
comparison with their introduced models. 
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Branching Process Model 
In probability theory, a branching process is known as a stochastic process and 
includes collections of random variables. It has been initially designed to mathematically 
model a population where each item in generation t generates an arbitrary number of 
elements in the generation t+1 according to a fixed probability distribution (Athreya, 2006) 
. For example, the item could be bacteria which produce 0,1, or 2 new children with a 
probability in a single period. 
Branching process model based on branching processes introduced by Dobson et al. 
(Dobson et al., 2004, Dobson et al., 2005a, Dobson, 2004) and the commensurate models, 
were designed to accurately model the cascade failures in complex networks. The system is 
considered to have infinite components. Also, a component which was faulty at time step t 
can be faulty again at time step t+1 with a probability p. The procedure ends when there is 
no further faulty components. Analysing the faulty components overall number statistically 
shows that when the fault propagation rate, which is the average probability over all faults, 
meets a specific threshold, the distribution of fault probability will be the power law with 
the coefficient equal to -1.5, which shows a significant risk especially when the system is in 
critical state (Dobson et al., 2004). Two issues should be considered while applying the 
branching process model on power systems. The number of elements is limited and also the 
system fault level should be a function of the fault spread rate. This process is an estimation 
of CASCADE model (Dobson et al., 2005a, Dobson, 2004). Further, Dobson et al. (Dobson 
et al., 2005a) showed that the relation between fault level and its propagation rate is linear.  
Although the branching process is physically significant, i.e. such an approximation captures 
some salient features of loading dependent cascading failure and suggests an approach to 
reduce the risk of large cascading failures by limiting the propagation of failures; it fails to 
consider the power systems dynamics and is limitedly applied to real power systems.  
For more clarifications, in CASCADE model in which all items are considered 
identical and independent from the network structure, the disturbance is distributed 
indiscriminately. The loading level of each component after disturbance is compared to its 
value and identifies the state of each element being normal or failed. Likewise, in the 
branching process, the number of components is considered to be infinite. Each component 
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generates its next state stochastically. The limitation of this procedure is that it ignores the 
network structure and the fault spread rate. 
 
3.4    Dynamic Cascade Failure Models in Power Systems 
The electric power system as a pillar of the economy is a complex infrastructure. 
Delivery of electric power across long distances is made possible via its inter-connectivity. 
But, at the same time, it could be turned into power system flaw since the disturbances can 
be propagated through the same network. In other words, the occurrence of blackouts raised 
by cascading failures is the direct result of electrical and physical properties of power 
systems. Cascading failure in power systems as a complex dynamical event is usually 
triggered by ever-rising demand, increasingly renewables penetration, power system 
component failures sudden load redistribution in transmission lines, complicated 
interconnections which sometimes gives rise to inevitable control systems malfunction. 
Even if this event is managed by protection relays’ immediate reaction by disconnecting the 
faulty line, it can make other lines overloaded, or busbars work higher than their standard 
limitations. Dwivedi et al. (Dwivedi and Yu, 2013) proposed a new centrality measure for 
ranking the power lines in a power system based on the maximum flow algorithm (Ford and 
Fulkerson, 1956a). They showed that in power systems, there are some power lines more 
vulnerable to attacks which if removed, there would be a significant drop in power system 
functionality by shifting their loads to adjacent components.  
In practice, usually, a blackout in power systems is a result of a combination of 
consecutive failures occurring as the subsequent of the initial failure (Baldick et al., 2008, 
Georgilakis and Hatziargyriou, 2015, Bialek et al., 2016, Dwivedi et al., 2010). The power 
system topological vulnerability evaluation models are limited as they only consider the 
static properties of the networks. To capture the dynamical properties of power systems and 
discover the procedure of cascade propagation in power systems, a number of dynamical 
models for power systems have been introduced. Here, we summarise these dynamical 
models used for studying the cascade mechanism and vulnerability analysis of power 
systems.  The cascade failure dynamic model of power systems is divided into three sub-
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categories. OPA model, which is mainly based on optimal DC power flow analysis, the 
model based on hidden faults and estimation of DC power flow analysis, and also 
Manchester model which fundamentally applies AC power flows and load shedding.  
 
ORNL-PSerc-Alaska (OPA) Model 
Load flow analysis methods, AC and DC power flow, are mainly applied to simulate 
the power system in the steady-state. The OPA model, ORNL-PSerc-Alaska, is a model to 
study the blackout proposed by scholars from three research institutes (Dobson et al., 2001) 
using the DC power flow method. In this model, two different dynamics for power systems 
are considered: slow and fast dynamics. Slow dynamics takes the power system’s long-term 
extension into consideration and studies the interaction between the load increase and the 
power system developments. Fast dynamics put the power system day to day operation under 
scrutiny (Carreras et al., 2001, Carreras et al., 2002a, Carreras et al., 2004, Carreras et al., 
2002b, Mei et al., 2009).  
In this model, when a single failure happens, the power of each busbar’s intakes is 
redistributed across the network to make a new steady-state. The only condition is to 
minimise the difference between power injected in all nodes before and after the failure. 
Then, the DC power flow is applied to calculate the power in all transmission lines and 
determine new failures. One of the most critical limitations of OPA model is that since all 
the calculations are based on DC power flow, to have accurate results, it is applicable only 
on lightly loaded power systems and is not able to assign the reactive power and voltage 
profiles. This is a considerable disadvantage since sometimes cascade failures occur in 
massively loaded power systems. 
 
Hidden Failure Model 
The idea behind the hidden failure model comes from a fault in a relay protection 
equipment which cannot be identified in normal operation but appears in special conditions 
when the system gets faulty (Chen et al., 2005, Tamronglak, 1994). It assumes that any line’s 
failure could be a result of a protection relay abnormality in its neighbouring lines. In this 
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model, if a transmission line fails, with a probability proportional to their new loadings, its 
adjacent lines are likely to fail too. The DC power flow analysis method is applied to assign 
the lines’ flow. Applying this model on power systems (Tamronglak, 1994), shows that the 
distribution of blackout exhibits power-law properties. It is worth mentioning that the hidden 
failure model is very similar to the fast dynamics OPA model.  Hence, it is only capable of 
modelling the lightly loaded power systems and cannot be applied to simulate the power 
system long-term development. 
 
Manchester Model 
Despite the previous dynamic model applying the DC power flow, in the Manchester 
model, the cascade failure is modelled using AC power flow analysis (Nedic et al., 2005, 
Rios et al., 2002, Kirschen et al., 2004). Because the equations in DC power flow analysis 
are primarily linear, usually the convergence of this method is not an issue. On the contrary, 
since calculating AC power flows in power systems needs nonlinear programming with 
nonlinear constraints, which in some cases does not converge to any solution. Thus, to make 
sure that the solution exists, the load shedding algorithm is added to this method. The most 
significant disadvantage of this model is to ignore the slow dynamics like the power system 
evolutional improvement and considering only the fast dynamics. 
To have an idea about these dynamic models, when a failure happens in the network, 
OPA model applies DC power flow model to redistribute busbars’ incoming power across 
the network to reach the steady-state. Hidden failure model considers the protection system 
relays’ hidden faults that may cause the line outage and as a result in this model, 
neighbouring lines could be faulty. It also applies DC power flow model for the analysis. 
Contrary to OPA and hidden failure models, the Manchester model uses AC power flow 
along with the load shedding schemes to overcome the divergence issues. The major point 
to keep in mind when finding a solution for these models is that divergence is always an 
issue in nonlinear programmings, such as AC power flow analysis, which highly depends on 
initial conditions and parameters constraints setups. 
  
 
52  Cascade Failures 
  
3.5    Conclusion 
In this chapter, we focused on cascade failures in complex networks and power 
systems as special case. First, the process of cascade failure in complex networks from initial 
failure following by load redistribution stage and approaching to final equilibrium point was 
reviewed. Likewise, cascade failure in complex networks was studied and different models 
of cascade were reviewed. 
There are generally two main categories including structural and component cascading 
dependent models. In latter section, static, Motter-Lai and Effective efficiency models were 
summarized. Then in the later category, CASCADE and branching process models were 
reviewed and pros and cons of each model were stated. Following that, the dynamic 
cascading models of power systems consisting OPA, Hidden failure and Manchester models 
were summed up. In OPA model, in case of any failure occurrence, to reach to another 
steady-state, the incoming power of each busbar is redistributed across the network. Hidden 
failure model considers the protection system relays hidden faults that may cause the line 
outage and as a result in this model, neighbouring lines could be faulty. Despite the OPA 
and hidden failure model which apply DC power flow to calculate power system parameters, 
Manchester model uses AC power flow along with the load shedding schemes to overcome 
the divergence issues.  
The following two chapters will focus on discovering behaviour of general complex 
networks during the cascade of failures in their components. The main purpose in these 
chapters is to figure out how to react to a failure in case it is critical enough to trigger a 
cascade of failures. To tackle these possible criticalities, we should always have some 
strategies ready to provide fast responses to such initial failures. The research summarised 
in chapter four shows that since degree centrality is negatively correlated with the cascade 
depth, the nodes with such attributes can act as fuses in a critical situations and their removal 
can be effective to preserve a more significant portion of affected network. To avoid 
unnecessary complexity and better achieve this objective and fairly compare the results for 
various complex networks, the dynamics of real networks, such as power networks, are 
neglected for simplicity, and the fundamental components for all complex networks are 
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considered to be the same. On the contrary, in chapter six, the major focus is on power 
networks, where based on power systems’ch dynamic models, a method is developed to 
deter the cascade from driving the whole network to the blackout state.
   
 
Chapter 4 
 
CASCADE FAILURES AND CENTRALITY 
MEASURES 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 By discovering the critical nodes in complex networks, one can control the 
propagation of information in social networks, spreading epidemics in society, and prevent 
disastrous cascade failures leading to blackouts in power grids or internet outages (Motter 
and Lai, 2002, Motter, 2004). However, finding vital nodes in a network is not trivial (Lü et 
al., 2016). At first, the term ‘vital node’ has a vast meaning. Sometimes, we are interested in 
finding the small set of people whose vaccination can stop the disease from spreading, while 
sometimes we need to find the most critical busbars which if failed, the power system will 
experience a cascade of failures. Secondly, to establish a reasonable balance between local 
and global parameters is challenging. The behaviour of a cascade failure depends on the 
location of the initial failure, i.e., the node(s)/edge(s) that initially fail. Such a study is 
missing in the literature, which will be addressed in this work. In this work, we examine a 
number of node centrality metrics on synthetic and real networks to study the role of each 
centrality measure in the cascade failure. To this end, we first obtain some centrality 
measures for the nodes, including degree, betweenness, closeness, clustering coefficient, 
eigenvalue, information index, lobbying index and local rank. We also consider cascade 
depth, which is defined as the number of failed nodes as a result of initial failure in a node. 
 
4.2 Related Works 
Cascade failures have been studied in the literature including on power grids (Saniee 
Monfared et al., 2014, Crucitti et al., 2004c, Kinney et al., 2005, Chen et al., 2010). However, 
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the previous works have mainly focused on modelling cascade failures (Dobson et al., 
2005c), designing efficient protection strategies (Koch et al., 2010, Vaiman et al., 2013) or 
studying the dependence of cascade failures on the structural properties (Wu et al., 2006, 
Buldyrev et al., 2010) of networks.  
Information cascade is a similar topic to cascade failure in the literature of network 
science. A piece of information, starting from a set of seed nodes, disseminates through the 
network. Influence maximisation is a well-known problem in this field, which is to find the 
optimal set of seed nodes such that initially activating them has the maximum influence, i.e., 
the largest number of finally activated nodes. Corley et al. (Corley Jr, 1974) defined the most 
vital nodes in a network as those whose failure engenders the highest decline in maximum 
flow between a particular node pair. In another work, Corley et al. (Corley and Y.S. David, 
1982) found the k-most vital nodes whose failure makes the shortest distance between two 
arbitrary nodes the highest possible. Real networks often have community structure. He et 
al. (J.-L. He, 2015) introduced an approach to find the top-k influential spreaders in networks 
with community structure. Recently, Jalili and Perc studied the correlation between influence 
range, i.e., the number of activated nodes as a result of initially activating a node, and 
centrality measure (Jalili and Perc, 2017). They used independent cascade model and 
identified the centrality measures showing strong positive correlations. In this work, as a 
node fails, it might trigger a cascade of failures according to explanations in chapter three. 
When the cascade stops, the number of failings as a result of initially failed node, is called 
its cascade depth. Cascade depth is indeed a measure indicating vitality of nodes about 
cascading failures and the larger values of cascade depth imply the higher criticality of node 
in cascade failure. Although the role of various node centrality measures on network 
functions has been studied in the literature (see reviews in (Lü et al., 2016, Jalili and Perc, 
2017)), there is no existing work to examine the relationship between centrality measure and 
cascade failure. The significant contribution of this work is to consider correlation of nodes’ 
vitality (i.e., their centrality) and their influence on the cascade failures measured by the 
cascade depth. 
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4.3 Motivation 
In this work, we study how the choice of the initial failure (based on the centrality 
values of the nodes) affects the cascade depth. Let us give a simple example to show how 
different choices for the location of the initial failure influences the outcome. Fig. 4.1 and 
4.2 graphically show the result of cascade failure in IEEE benchmark 30-bus network. The 
cascades are performed in two different cases: when a non-critical node (node 25 in Fig 4.1) 
initially fails and when the failure happens in a critical one (node 6 in Fig 4.2). As it is seen, 
by failing the non-critical node, majority of the nodes are survived from the failures; whereas 
removing a critical node results in a dramatic outcome by failing two-thirds of the network. 
It is worth adding that T = 1 represents the system’s initial conditions, but the cascading 
failure is not trivial under this situation. On the contrary, most of the components’ failure 
cannot trigger the cascade of failures and the cascade chain will stop after spreading only in 
few (mostly local) steps. In Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, only those few components (nodes 25 and 6) 
are removed to first examine that if they can trigger the cascade of failure, and second how 
critical their failure is in terms of preserving the rest of the network. As it can be witnessed 
from Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, removing node 6, totally dysfunctions the network. But many other 
nodes cannot trigger this cascade to proceed even for a few steps.  
Table. 4.1 compares the centrality indices and the percentage of removed nodes as a 
result of the failure of nodes 6, 21, and 25 for T=1.0, 1.5, and 1.9. 
 
Table. 4. 1 Centrality indices and cascade depth for nodes 6, 21, and 25 for T=1.0, 1.5, and 1.9 
Node# ki ρi Cli xi Ci al_index LR INFi T=1 T=1.5 T=1.9 
6 7 0.95 1.81 0.003 0.154 4.66 1.0 0.68 0.7 0.63 0.6 
21 2 0.69 1.75 0.0008 1.0 4.49 0.33 0.54 0.33 0.3 0.3 
25 4 0.59 1.09 0.107 0 3.0 0.16 0.41 0.3 0.3 0.26 
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Fig. 4. 1 Impact of node criticality on the depth of cascading failure in IEEE 30 Bus network  
The capacity parameter is set to T = 1 for simplicity. A) when a non-critical node (node 25) is removed. (a) The original 
network with the link width proportional to their load (betweenness centrality measure), (b) initially, node 25 is removed, 
and as a result the node 26 gets disconnected which are shown in grey, (c) the overall load is redistributed through the 
network, and as a result of overloading in some edges (displayed as thicker links than the original case),  and their removal, 
the isolated nodes (shown in red), get removed, (d) further load redistribution happens in the network and (e) node 21 gets 
removed, (f) Finally, in the equilibrium point, the cascade stops and no edge is removed 
 
4.4 Cascade Depth 
To study cascade failures in networks, as is explained in chapter three, we assume that 
each edge eij has bounded capacity Cij, demonstrating the utmost load which can be delivered 
by the edge. We suppose that Cij is proportional to its initial load Wij, (Cij = TWij), where T > 
1 is the capacity parameter (Mirzasoleiman et al., 2011, Wang and Chen, 2008). At the outset,  
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Fig. 4. 2 Impact of node criticality on the depth of cascading failure in IEEE 30 Bus network  
The capacity parameter is set to T = 1 for simplicity. When a critical node is removed. (a) The network is working normally 
and the width of the links is proportional to their load, (b) initially, node 6 (shown in grey) is removed, (c) the overall load 
is redistributed through the network and as a result of overloading in some edges and their removal, the isolated nodes 
which (shown in red) are removed, (d) further load redistribution happens in the network and (e) node 21 gets removed, (f) 
Finally, in the equilibrium point, the cascade stops, and no edge is removed 
 
the initial loads (betweenness centrality in this work) are calculated for all edges. Then, the 
cascade is triggered by removing the very first node. We choose the initial node for removal 
based on different centrality measures (e.g., degree, betweenness or closeness); the node 
with the highest centrality is removed (if there are more than one node with maximal 
centrality, one of them is randomly removed). Note that when a node fails, all edges 
connecting to that node are also removed from the network. As the initial node is removed, 
the betweenness centrality is recomputed, and all nodes with betweenness centrality higher 
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than their capacity are removed. This process continues until no further removal is required 
and a steady state is obtained. As a measure of the cascade depth, we calculate the number 
of nodes removed from the network; the larger the number of the removed nodes, the more 
severe the cascade. It is worth mentioning that at each step the nodes - to be failed - are 
discovered and removed at the same time at the end of that time step. We then apply the 
Spearman rank correlation (Spearman, 1904, Fieller et al., 1957) to find the relation between 
the cascade depth and the centrality indices. A pseudo-code of the procedure is presented in 
Procedure 4.1. In next section, we systematically study components’ criticality for cascade 
failures. 
 
Procedure 4.1: Cascade Failure and Centrality Measures 
For a given graph G with N nodes 
 For a certain value for the capacity parameter T 
  1: Calculate the initial load (betweenness centrality) for all edges (Wij) and set (Cij = 
TWij); also calculate all nodes’ centrality parameters (e.g. degree, betweenness). All the 
centralities are normalised using: 
𝐶𝑖−𝑛 =
𝐶𝑖 − 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
where Ci is the centrality of node vi and Ci-n is its normalised centrality. 𝐶𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 
are the maximum and minimum centrality of nodes, respectively. The normalized 
centralities scale in the range [0, 1]. 
  2: For each node vi , i=1…, N 
  3:  Remove node vi and all the edges connected to vi.     
  4:  Recalculate the load of the remained edges and remove those with load larger 
than their capacity. 
  5:  Repeat 4 until no component gets removed, and the cascade stops. 
  6:  Calculate the cascade depth for node i: 
    
(𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ)𝑖  =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑠
𝑁
 
  7:  Calculate the Spearman correlation between the cascade depth and centrality metrics.       
 
4.5 Simulation Setup 
In this section, we provide details of the numerical simulation set up. As mentioned, 
the cascade failure process is based on computing loads for edges. In this work, we take 
betweenness centrality of edges as their loads. To obtain cascade depth for a node, it is 
initially removed from the network. When a node is removed, all its connecting edges are 
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also removed from the network. Then, the load (betweenness centrality) of the edges is 
recalculated, and those with load higher than their capacity are removed from the network. 
This process continues until no further removal is performed. The cascade depth is the 
number of failed nodes as a consequence of such a process. Here, we first obtain the cascade 
depth of all nodes. Then, we obtain the Spearman rank correlation between the cascade depth 
and centrality measures. To calculate the Spearman correlation between two variables, the 
Pearson correlation is assessed between their rank values. Unlike Pearson correlation which 
computes linear relationships, Spearman's correlation computes monotonic relationships. If 
the observations of two variables have a similar rank, the Spearman correlation will be high 
with the value close to 1. In case their ranks are dissimilar, this value will be around -1.  
We repeat the process for different values of the capacity parameter T. Naturally, as T 
increases, the networks become more tolerant against cascade failures. However, this means 
that the capacity of the network also increases, which requires a higher cost. Thus, in many 
cases, it is desired to make the network resilient against cascade failures by designing a 
minimum T.  
A positive (or direct) correlation between the cascade depth and centrality measures 
means that the higher the centrality of a node, the more severe effect its failure has on the 
network. Whereas, negative (or inverse) correlation indicates that failure in nodes with 
higher centrality has less effect (i.e., lower cascade depth) than failure in those with lower 
centrality values.  
All the program coding and calculation are performed in Python. To reduce the 
complexity, the group centrality measures are applied for edges betweenness calculation at 
each iteration, which is computationally efficient, especially for large-scale networks. 
 
4.6 Results and Discussion 
In this work, we consider both synthetic and real networks. As synthetic networks, we 
use BA, WS and ER networks which are explained in section 2.1. Here we also study a 
number of real networks. We consider eight power networks including Australian high 
voltage grid, Western US power grid, European power network, UK power grid, French 
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power grid, Spanish power grid, IEEE 300 Bus and 118 Bus benchmark networks. We also 
study some other real networks including the Internet in the level of the Autonomous system, 
US Airport network, Melbourne road network and Melbourne water networks. Table. 2.1 
represents the structural features of the real networks considered in this work. 
In this section, we carry out several numerical simulations to study how the choice of the 
location of the initial failure impacts the cascade depth. The simulation is conducted on both 
synthetic and real networks. The results and discussion about the findings are as follows. 
 
4.6.1 Synthetic networks 
At this stage, to have enough structural diversity over synthetic networks, each 
network is generated 100 times and the results show averages over these 100 realizations. 
Also, for each network type, three probability values are considered (P=0.001, P=0.01, 
P=0.1) to get diverse density values. Another major structural diversity is achieved using 
various setups over three main synthetic network categories (ER, WS, and BA). For 
example, a combination of parameters m and P for WS networks or combining B and m for 
BA networks, is considered. 
The synthetic networks are constructed with 1000 nodes and different parameters. As 
explained above, the simulations results are the average over 100 realizations. Fig. 4.3 shows 
the results for Erdos-Renyi networks with N = 1000 and two connection probabilities (P = 
0.01 and P = 0.001).  
 
Different centrality measures are tested including degree, betweenness, closeness, 
eigenvector, clustering, average lobby index, local rank, and information index. As it can be 
seen, three centrality measures have higher correlation values among others. The degree 
centrality is correlated negatively with the cascade depth, while betweenness centrality and 
local rank are positively correlated. Information index shows a positive correlation for denser 
networks (Fig. 4.3b), while its correlation is close to zero for sparse networks. Note that 
positive correlation indicates that as the value of the centrality measure increases, the 
cascade depth also increases (i.e., more nodes will fail as a result of a failure in a node).  
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Fig. 4. 3 Nodes cascade depth and centralities correlation in Erdos-Renyi networks (N = 1000) 
Erdos-Renyi network is constructed by creating a link between any two nodes with probability P. Different centrality 
measures are tested including degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, clustering, average lobby index, local rank, and 
information index. The networks are with N = 1000 and (a) P = 0.01; (b) P =0.001. The data shows average over 100 
realisations.  
 
Figs. 4.4 and 4.5 show the results for Watts-Strogatz small-world and scale-free 
networks, respectively. Again, the degree centrality is negatively correlated with the cascade 
depth, while betweenness centrality shows a positive correlation. While closeness and 
eigenvector centrality show almost no relation with cascade depth, there is a small trend of 
oscillation in clustering centrality in scale-free case. As the connection probability decreases 
in Watts-Strogatz networks, the average lobby index gets more negative correlation with 
cascade depth. In higher values of P, there is no meaningful relationship between these two 
parameters. Local rank shows a positive relationship with the cascade depth, which is in a 
good agreement with results on another dynamical process (information propagation) 
(Eguiluz and Klemm, 2002, Thomas and Paolo, 2004). However, as the networks become 
denser, this local interrelation is overwhelmed by global distribution of edges, and as a result 
the influence of the local rank in denser networks is lower than their corresponding sparser 
networks. It is worth mentioning that for Watts-Strogatz networks, the local connectedness 
(and clustering coefficient) decreases by increasing P. Except a small swing between 
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information index correlation with cascade depth in lower probabilities of connection in 
Watts-Strogatz, there is no evidence of connection between these two values in Figs. 4.4 and 
4.5.  
 
Fig. 4. 4 Nodes cascade depth and centralities correlation in watts-Strogatz networks (N = 1000) 
To create the watts-Strogatz network, first, a ring graph in which each node is connected to its m-nearest neighbor is 
considered. Then, the links are rewired with probability P. (a) m = 2, P = 0.1; (b) m=2, P=0.01;(c) m=2, P=0.001; (d) m=5, 
P=0.1; (e) m=5, P=0.01; (f) m=5, P=0.001; (g) m=10, P=0.1; (h) m=10, P=0.01; (i) m=10, P=0.001. 
 
There is another trend in Fig 4.4 (g-i), which is worth mentioning in terms of impact 
of the capacity parameter on correlation trends. This figure shows that in these WS networks 
(m=10) and for higher density values, as T increases, the betweenness centrality shows 
significant correlation with the cascade depth. On the contrary, with the density values 
decreasing, the betweenness shows less relationship with the cascade depth. This trend could 
be interpreted as saturation in the relationship between the betweenness and cascade depth 
when the capacity parameters exceed a threshold value as the density decreases.  
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Fig. 4. 5 Nodes cascade depth and centralities correlation in scale-free networks (N = 1000) 
Scale-free networks are created using preferential attachment method (a) B=0, m=2; (b) B=10, m=2; (c) B=0, m=5; (d) 
B=10, m=5; (e) B=0, m=10; (f) B=10, m=10.  
 
Fig. 4.6 shows the correlations for modular networks, where the same phenomenon is 
observed. To construct modular networks, we first create five distinct modules each 
comprising 200 nodes, with one of the synthetic methods stated above (Erdos-Renyi, Watts-
Strogatz or scale-free). Then, with probability P, these modules are connected to form a 
unified network with N = 1000. It can be observed that increasing the probability of 
connection between the modules weakens the influence of the local rank, which is mainly 
due to the reduction of local connectedness. The same trend exists for node’s betweenness 
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centrality wherein higher probabilities of modules connection, there is a higher correlation 
between betweenness centrality and cascade depth, whereas it almost fades in lower values 
of P. For all other centrality indices, no connection with cascade depth can be witnessed. 
 
4.6.2 Real networks 
 Figs. 4.7 and 4.8 show the correlation of the cascade depth with other centrality 
measures for real-world networks. In Fig. 4.7 we simulate the cascading failure process in 
eight distinct power grids with a different number of nodes and edges. The results show that 
four centrality measures are dominant with higher correlation values. While degree centrality 
has a high negative correlation with the cascade depth in all power grids, the clustering 
coefficient is negatively correlated with the cascade depth is rather sparse networks. On the 
other hand, betweenness and local rank are positively correlated, with local rank having 
higher correlation values than betweenness. Although average lobby index exhibits a 
noticeably negative correlation with cascade depth especially for smaller power networks, 
clustering centrality shows negative connection with cascade depth almost in all cases of 
power grids. Again, there is a slight swing in information index around zero for less dense 
grids. 
 
Fig. 4. 6 Nodes cascade depth and centralities correlation in Modular networks (N = 1000) 
The networks comprise 5 modules each consisting 200 nodes. These modules are connected with probability P. (a) P=0.1; 
(b) P=0.01; (c) P=0.001.  
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Fig. 4. 7 Nodes cascade depth and centralities correlation in Power networks 
(a) Australia power grid N = 1130, E = 1426 (total number of links);  (b) US Power Grid N = 4941, E  = 6594; (c) European 
Power Grid N = 1494, E = 2156; (d) UK Power Grid N = 327, E = 407;  (e) IEEE 300-Bus N = 300, E = 409; (f) French 
Power Grid N = 146, E = 223; (g) IEEE 118-Bus System N = 118, E = 179; (h) Spanish Power Grid N = 98, E = 175.   
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Fig. 4. 8 Nodes cascade depth and centralities correlation in real networks  
(a) Internet in the level of Autonomous System N = 3233, E = 5773; (b) Melbourne Natural Water Network N = 2145, E = 
2644; (c) Melbourne Roads Grid N = 1830, E = 2678; (d) Us Airports Network N = 1574, E = 17215. 
  
Fig.4.8 shows the results for some other real networks. Again, while the degree is 
highly negatively correlated with cascade depth of a node, except the airport case, 
betweenness shows a light correlation with it. A similar pattern is correct for local rank where 
except the roads network which demonstrates the high connection between local rank and 
cascade depth, in other cases they are less correlated. Also, it is interesting that information 
index is almost highly positively correlated in US airport network and the Internet in the 
level of the autonomous system with less relation for other networks. Finally, clustering 
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coefficient among other centrality indices displays a small correlation swing around zero for 
these real networks. 
The above results show that in some cases, there are patchy correlations between 
cascade depth and some particular centrality measures. In Erdos-Renyi networks, for small 
values of the connection probability, the relationship between the information index 
centrality and the cascade depth jumps to 0.7. Also, in Watts-Strogatz networks with small 
rewiring probability, the average lobby index interestingly shows a negative correlation with 
cascade depth. In power grids, similar behaviour is observed for clustering centrality where 
it shows a negative correlation in almost all the cases. There are however three centrality 
measures with almost consistent behaviour across all synthetic and real networks. Although 
with varying strength, the degree centrality shows negative correlation with the cascade 
depth, while the betweenness and local rank centrality measures show positive correlations. 
These findings can be used to design networks that are resilient against cascade 
failures. A possible approach to minimise the effects of cascade failure is to do some 
structural intervention in the network. One can structurally intervene in a network by adding, 
removing and restructuring components (nodes/edges). Our results indicate that a network 
can be made resilient against cascade failures by removing the highest-degree nodes. Indeed, 
one can make a network more resilient by removing nodes that are ranked high regarding 
those centrality measures showing a negative correlation with cascade depth.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, in order to investigate the impact of initial components’ break on the 
level of destruction caused by cascade failures, we set up a simulation by studying the effect 
of nodes’ attributes on the surviving network size when the cascade stops. To have a better 
scale for comparison, we considered a centrality measure based on cascade failure process 
(i.e., cascade depth) and studied its correlation with other centrality measures including 
degree, betweenness, closeness, clustering coefficient, local rank, eigenvalue, lobbying 
index and information index. To obtain the cascade depth for a node, we first triggered a 
failure from that node and then got the number of subsequently failed nodes as a result of 
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cascade failures in the network. The study was carried out in a number of models (Erdos-
Renyi, Barabasi-Albert, Watts-Strogatz, and modular) and real (power grids, roads network, 
natural water network, airport, and the Internet in the autonomous level) networks.  
Not all centrality measures have remarkable impacts on cascade failure criticality of a 
node. Indeed, a considerable number of these parameters do not show any significant 
correlation with cascade depth and are removed from the final shortlisted centrality 
variables. The remaining node centrality measures are concluded to have the most definitive 
effect in controlling the cascade of failures when the strategies for deterring them from 
happening are planned. Based on our simulation results, it is evident that among all node 
centrality measures, only three of them, i.e. node degree centrality, betweenness and local 
rank, show high correlation with cascade depth. Hence, these three centralities can be applied 
to control the criticality of cascade failure before and after it is triggered. Interestingly, we 
found that the cascade depth is negatively correlated with the degree, indicating that initial 
failure in higher-degree nodes will result in lower cascade depth (i.e., less failed nodes as a 
result of cascade failure process). While, betweenness centrality and local rank showed a 
positive correlation with the cascade depth, indicating that nodes with higher betweenness 
and local rank centrality (and not those with high degrees) should be further protected to be 
resilient against cascade failures. Indeed, to some extent, the nodes with higher degrees, 
behave like fuses which if removed during the cascade, end up preserving a more substantial 
part of the network from failure with the price of disconnecting a small partition of it. Our 
results can be used to mitigate cascade failures in complex networks by removing nodes 
ranked high in terms of those centrality measures showing negative correlations with the 
cascade depth.
   
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
CASCADE PROPAGATION STRUCTURE 
 
 
5.1    Introduction  
A solution to deter the cascade failures is to predict the edge(s) which might fail at the 
next step by tracing the cascade propagation route. Chen et al. (Chen and McCalley, 2005)  
introduced an approach for identifying the high-risk contingencies known as contingency set 
as a fundamental stage in monitoring the power system security level (Jian and McCalley, 
2001). Phadke and Elizondo et al. (Phadke and Thorp, 1996, Elizondo et al., 2001) 
introduced a method to detect the hidden failure in protection devices like relays in an online 
manner to avoid cascade failures. To the best of our consideration, there is no systematic 
investigation of what exactly occurs when a single or multiple edge removals, trigger a 
cascade of failure. In this work, we first investigate the impact of single edge failures and 
discover the spreading route of the cascades in networks. The relation between the cascade 
propagation pathway and the cascade stage is examined. Then, concurrent edge failures are 
put under scrutiny to find out how the cascade propagation depends on the topological 
relationships between the edges from which the cascade initially starts. According to our 
findings, the complex networks’ response to the single edge failure is entirely different from 
that of multiple edge failure. It mentions that the strategies to manage these two types of 
components breakdowns should be designed accordingly.  
 
5.2    Structure of Cascade Propagation  
An essential issue in studying cascade failures in complex networked systems is the 
dynamics of cascade propagation and to analyse the sequence of consecutively failed edges. 
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This section addresses this issue and examines the pathway of cascade propagation. To have 
a better understanding of the cascade propagation mechanism, let us first define EGD (Edge 
Geodesic Distance), which is a metric to quantify the topological distance between two 
edges. Let us consider edge e1 between nodes vi and vj and edge e2 between nodes vp and vq. 
EGD between these two edges is defined as: 
 𝐸𝐺𝐷(𝑒1, 𝑒2) =  min(𝑙𝑖𝑝, 𝑙𝑖𝑞, 𝑙𝑗𝑝, 𝑙𝑗𝑞) (5-1) 
where EGD is the Edge Geodesic Distance and lip is the length of the shortest path between 
nodes vi and vp. 
Depending on the network topology and the criticality of the initially failed edges, the 
cascade could last even more than 50 steps, at which the highest loaded edges will be 
removed from the network, and the cascade process evolves through the next steps. Let us 
define the cascade step as ‘cascade order’. Under this definition, the initially failed edges 
have a cascade order of zero. The edge failing in the first step after the initial load 
redistribution has cascade order of one; the failing edge in the second step has a cascade 
order of two and so on. Our aim in this work is to study the edge geodesic distances as a 
function of the cascade order.  
To have a reliable statistical estimate, we run the simulations for all possible single 
edge failures or two-edge and three-edge failures and show the averages over all these values 
i.e. this is an exhaustive search and the order of removal does not matter. For example, for 
Spanish power grid with 98 edges, we first remove the edges one by one and study the 
cascade failure as a consequence of this initial failure which results in utmost 98 distinct lists 
of EGD values depending on whether removal of an edge can trigger a cascade failure. These 
lists generally have different lengths since, for each initial failure, the cascade may last for 
different cascade orders. Finally, for each cascade order t the average over all lists is 
calculated as the propagation route. 
A pseudo-code of the cascade propagation algorithm when a single edge removal 
triggers a cascade of failures is provided in procedure 5.1. The algorithm begins by initially 
failing an edge ei. All edges removed in next steps of the algorithm (including the initially 
removed edge ei) are recorded in γ that is a list which keeps track of the removed edges 
according to the cascade order. When the initial failure happens, the load is redistributed all 
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over the network, and the new loads are calculated for the edges. The load computation 
method for all lines in complex networks is edge betweenness centrality as per equation 2-
16. Edge betweenness centrality is one of the most common parameters for the weight 
allocation (Mirzasoleiman et al., 2011, Zhu et al., 2012). Intuitively, the higher the loads in 
a line is, the bigger will be the value of edge betweenness for that line. The highly loaded 
lines in the complex networks demonstrate bridge-like components between two different 
sections of the network and their failure may affect the information delivery at substantial 
portion of the network. Following the load calculation for each edge, the edge with the 
highest load (eh) is identified, and if its load is higher than the predefined threshold value T, 
it is removed from the network and added to γi. Let us denote the edge added to γi at time t 
by γi(t). This process is iterated until no more edges are removed, where the cascade stops. 
Then, EGD, as defined in equation (5-1), is calculated between edges removed in 
consecutive orders. Let us define σi(t) as the EGD calculated between γi(t) and γi(t+1). This 
cascade failure process is repeated by selecting all edges, one-by-one, as the initially failed 
edge. Let’s suppose that the highest cascade order is th. Indeed, th = maximum cardinality of 
σi(t). We then calculate the cascade propagation route as 
 µ(𝑡) =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝜎𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 (𝑡)  ;     𝑡 = 1 … 𝑡ℎ (5-2) 
Let us make an example of how this method works. Suppose that we have three edges 
(e1, e2, e3) initially failed and removed from the network, one at a time, and the corresponding 
lists of consecutively removed edges for them  (σ1, σ2, σ3) are as σ1= [0, 1, 1], σ2= [0, 2, 2], 
and σ3= [1, 2, 4,4]. For example, the values in σ1 show that after removal of e1, the EGD 
between the edge which is immediately failing and e1, is zero implying that they share a node 
and so on. It is clear that for this example th = 4 representing the highest cascade order in σ3. 
These explanations lead the cascade propagation route to be as: 
 µ(t) = [
0+0+1
3
,
1+2+2
3
,
1+2+4
3
,
4
1
] = [0.33, 1.67, 2.33, 4] 
It implies that for example at cascade order t =1 the average of EGDs for all failed 
edges (those in γ) is 0.33. At cascade order t =2 this value is 1.67 that is higher than very 
first cascade order.  
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µ: cascade propagation route 
e0: an initial single edge failure 
 γ: the list of removed edges 
eh : the highest loaded edge 
σ: a list of EGDs between two consecutive edges in γ 
t: cascade order 
th: the highest cascade order 
 
5.2.1 An Illustrative Example 
In this section, an example is provided to explain how the cascade is propagated when 
a single edge is removed from the network. Let us consider the IEEE 118-bus benchmark 
network as an example. Fig. 5.1a shows the portion of the network that is affected by the 
failure. First, the transmission line connecting the buses 59 and 63 fails and is removed from 
the network. This failure causes the shortfall power to be compensated by the rest of the 
network, which in turn causes an overload in other transmission lines, resulting in their 
Procedure 5.1: Cascaded Propagation Algorithm for Single Edge Failure 
Given a connected graph G = (N, E) and a threshold value T 
 1: µ is an empty array 
 2: For any i and ei ∈ E: 
 3:   γ  is an empty array to record the list of removed edges 
 4:   ei→ γ save the initially failed edge in γ  
 5:   (G-ei)→G removes the ei from the graph 
 
6: 
  Recalculate load of each edge (L) using equation 2-16, 
Find the highest loaded edge eh=argmax (L)  
 7:   If Lh > T  
 8    eh → γ record the next –to be failed – edge  
 9    eh is removed from the graph (G- eh )→G    
 10:   Repeat 6 until no more edge fails, and the cascade stops. 
 
11: 
  σ is an empty array to record the EGDs between the 
edges consecutively saved in γ  
 12:   For item γi(t) corresponding to the cascade order t  
 13:   σi(t)=EGD(γi(t), γi(t+1))  
 14: Arrange the σi lists according to their length (The longest first) 
 15: For t∈ [0: th], 
 16:  (number of lists (𝜎) with length ≥ t )→ m 
 17:  Calculate µ(t) using equation 5-2 
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possible failure. Not to mention that failure of any overloaded line depends on its tolerance 
against overload. This parameter is identified as a threshold value. In this example, as it can 
be seen, the line between buses 63 and 64 is the first line affected by this overload; it fails in 
response to the initial failure of the links between buses 59 and 63, with cascade order of 1.  
 
 
Fig. 5.  1 Cascade propagation concept for IEEE 118 bus in the case of single edge removal 
(a) shows the cascade route when the edge connecting the buses 59 and 63 is removed. The next edge which fails is 63-64, 
having cascade order 1. (b) presents the edge geodesic distance which is an average of topological distances between two 
consecutively removed edges at each cascade order. The trend of edge geodesic distance is increasing as the cascade keeps 
going from lower cascade orders to the higher cascade orders, implying that the cascade tends to spread locally first, then 
propagated globally all over the network by bigger hops. 
 
Likewise, at the next cascade order, another power line connected to the busbar 64 is 
overloaded and fails, having cascade order 2. Fig. 5.1 b shows µ as average EGD against the 
cascade order for this example network. This figure indeed describes the topological 
relationships within the consecutively affected edges at each cascade order when the failure 
initially starts from the edge between buses 59 and 63. Explicitly, by removal of this edge, 
the edge geodesic distances for the first order is zero as lines 63-59 and 63-64 share busbar 
63. At the second cascade order, the removed edge shares the busbar 64 with the line 63-64, 
and thus the edge geodesic distance is also zero for this case. Note that in studying the 
cascade propagation route, the edge geodesic distance always is calculated between two 
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consecutively failed edges. It is evident that initially the cascade is propagated locally in the 
close neighbourhood of the removed edge with lower cascade orders. However, as cascade 
evolves to higher orders, it is spread in areas much farther than the vicinity of the initially 
failed edge.  
 
 
ζ: cascade route accumulator 
λ0: Average edge geodesic distance between initially failed edges 
λh: the highest λ0 which could be equal to power system graph diameter 
 
It is worth clarifying that we examine the way in which a cascade of failures propagates 
in a complex network. The network selection is independent of the network type. The study 
in this chapter is conducted in general complex network context and is not limited to power 
Procedure 5.2: Cascaded Propagation Algorithm for Concurrent Edge Failure 
A connected graph G = (N, E) and a Threshold value T 
 1: ζ is an empty list, µ is an empty array 
 
2: 
For λ∈ [0: λh]   (λh: the highest possible EGD which could be the 
graph diameter) 
 3:  ζ(λ)=∅, ζ contains many empty lists 
 4: For any F0 ⊆ E  
 5: Calculate λ0 (average EGD between edges in F0) 
 6:   γ is an empty array to keep track of removed edges 
 7:   F0→ γ   
 8:   (G-F0)→G  F0 is removed from the graph 
 
9: 
  Recalculate   L, 
eh=argmax (L) 
 10:   If Lh > T  
 11:    eh → γ  
 12:    (G- eh) →G The highest loaded edge is removed 
 13:   Repeat 9 until no more edge fails, and the cascade stops. 
 
14: 
  σ is an empty array to record the EGDs between the 
edges consecutively saved in γ 
 15:   For item γi(t) corresponding to the cascade order t 
 16:    σ(t)=EGD (γ(t), γ(t+1)) 
 
17: 
  ζ(λ0) +σ → ζ(λ0) according to λ0, the σ is aggregated to 
the corresponding list 
 18: For λ∈ [0: λh] 
 19:  m= length (ζ(λ)) 
 20:  Calculate µ (𝜆) using equation 5-3 
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networks. No real complex network dynamics are reflected in simulations as all the nodes 
are considered to be identical. The aim is to discover the next area where the cascade might 
be propagated into. Therefore, Fig. 5.1 can be simply replaced by the cascade propagation 
route diagram for any other real or synthetic complex network.   
A procedure similar to the above is performed for the cases of simultaneous two- and 
three-edge removals. The algorithm starts by initially failure F0 on the network, where F0 
can be any possible combination of two or three edges over the network. Here, we calculate 
λ0 which is the average edge geodesic distance between the edges in F0. The rest of this 
process is similar to procedure 5.1 except at the final stage where we calculate the average 
edge geodesic distance for the cascade propagation versus λ0. We then compute the cascade 
propagation route as 
 µ(𝜆) =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝜁(𝜆)
𝜆ℎ
𝜆=0  (5-3) 
 
5.3    Simulation Results 
In this section, the cascade propagation methodology is applied on some synthetic 
networks as well as real-world networks ranging from biological networks to road networks, 
from power grids to airport and natural water distribution network. In this section, the edge 
betweenness is used to evaluate the centrality of edges as an identical meter. Table. 2.3 briefs 
the number of nodes and edges in the network under consideration. 
This section provides the numerical simulation results for the cascade propagation 
route where the cascade failure is induced by single or multiple edge removal. Since the 
trend for single edge removal and concurrent edge removal are entirely different, their 
simulation results are presented separately. For both cases, the simulations are conducted on 
benchmark networks introduced in section 2.4.  
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Fig. 5.  2 Cascade propagation route for Synthetic networks, triggered by single edge removal 
The networks are ER, WS, and BA random networks. The error bars show the standard deviation. After iterating the 
single edge removal algorithm (procedure 5.1) on all edges, for each cascade order, the average and standard deviation of 
the edge geodesic distance is calculated. 
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Fig. 5.  3 Cascade propagation route for power networks triggered by single edge removal 
The networks consist of Spanish, French, UK and Australian power grids. Other designations are as Fig. 5.2 
 
5.3.1 Single Edge Removal 
In this section, the local propagation pattern of cascade failures caused by single edge 
removal is studied. To this end, for each edge in the network initially an edge is removed at 
a time, and the edge betweenness is applied to calculate the load of all remaining edges. 
Then, the highest loaded edge (eh) is identified, and if its load exceeds its nominal capacity 
(which is set using the threshold value), it fails and consequently gets removed from the 
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network. This process keeps on going until no further edge is overloaded, where the cascade 
stops. We then use the algorithm introduced in Procedure 5.1 to compute the edge geodesic 
distance, as expressed by equation (5-2), which identifies how the cascade propagates. This 
algorithm is repeated for every single edge in the network, and finally, the average EGD is 
reported as the route the cascade propagates. A small value for the average EGD implies that 
the cascades propagates primarily into the local neighbourhood, while its large value 
indicates global propagation of the cascade.  
 
 
Fig. 5.  4 Cascade propagation route for Biological networks triggered by single edge removal 
Networks: Macaque cortical connectivity, Cat cortex, and C. elegans neural network. Other designations are as Fig. 5.2
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Fig. 5.  5 Cascade propagation route for real networks triggered by single edge removal 
The networks consist of Melbourne road and natural water, and US Airport networks. Other designations are as Fig. 5.2 
 
Fig. 5.2 to 5.5 represent the cascade propagation profile for Synthetic, power grids, 
biological and real networks, respectively. It is seen that the cascades propagate locally for 
small cascade orders, while it tends to propagate globally throughout the network by 
increasing the cascade order. For lower cascade orders, small average EGD implies that 
when the failure of an edge triggers a cascade, the edges in its neighbourhood are the most 
vulnerable ones and are more likely to fail. Therefore, the local vicinity needs further 
protection. From the power system perspective, to keep the power flowing to the loads in 
the affected areas, power should be delivered from the generators closest to the loads. This 
process would minimise the unwanted effects of cascade propagation and is only possible 
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through the transmission lines adjacent to the failed line. As the cascade keeps ongoing and 
more extensive areas are involved, it becomes difficult to predict which part of the complex 
network is the next to be affected. In this stage, the cascade aggressively propagates almost 
all over the network, which may result in an uncontrollable sequence of failures, and large-
scale blackouts in power system case. 
In Fig 5.2, the diameter of both ER and BA networks is 4. Any of these numbers are 
averages over lots of EGDs and are generally independent. An initial small average EGD 
implies that when the failure of an edge triggers a cascade, the edges in its neighbourhood 
are the most vulnerable ones and are more likely to fail. As the cascade keeps on going and 
more extensive areas are involved, it becomes difficult to predict which part of the network 
is the next to be affected. In this stage, the cascade aggressively propagates almost all over 
the network. Regarding the oscillation in BA networks, the smaller values belong to highly 
connected nodes which takes time (cascade order) for the cascading failure procedure to 
remove all their connection, and when the cascade propagates to other areas, there is an 
increase in average EGD. 
In Fig 5.3, in higher orders around 12 and13, a spike in average edge geodesic distance 
can be seen, which belongs to the last connections in the network and happens when the 
network has lost its connectivity and become totally dysfunctional. 
 
 
5.3.2 Concurrent Edge Removal 
In some cases, more than one edge failure might happen at the same time. Due to the 
fact that two failures cannot be exactly concurrent in real-time, one could be the consequence 
of another one that has not been managed properly. This could be a result of initial single 
edge failure which is not managed properly and leads to another failure or a fault in control 
system which gives rise to protection systems failures. For such conditions, we use the 
pseudocode provided in Procedure 5.2. Depending on the edge geodesic distance between 
the initially failed edges, the behaviour of the affected network might change. Fig. 5.6 to 5.9 
show the result for two and three concurrent edge failures in benchmark networks. These 
networks exhibit an interesting behaviour; when the edge geodesic distance between initially 
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failed edges are small, meaning that the fault is happening in a small area by removing two 
or three edges at the same time, the average cascade steps grow in the opposite direction, 
which implies that the cascade propagates in farther areas.   
 
 
Fig. 5.  6 Cascade propagation route in synthetic networks (ER, WS, SF) in concurrent edge failure cases. 
 All the synthetic networks consist of 200 nodes and almost 1000 edges. The structural properties of this network can be 
found in Table. 2.3. Distance between initially failed edges depends on the network diameter which is the highest 
distance between any pair of nodes in the network. As the initially failed edges are close together, the cascade spreads in 
farthest areas as it is evident from higher average globality values. Then up to a breakpoint, this trend keeps ongoing. The 
cascade behaviour totally changes after this point where two or three concurrent failures happen too far from each other 
and cannot boost each other’s destructive impact. That’s the reason the cascade propagation route follows the single line 
failure inclination  
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Fig. 5.  7 Cascade propagation route in Australian, UK, Spanish, and French power grids in concurrent edge failure cases 
In some power systems the network’s diameter is a bigger value, so in horizontal axis there is distance between initially 
failed edges up to 25. Cascade tends to propagate in farther areas as the edges are so close together up to a threshold point 
(8 for Australian, 9 for UK, 3 for Spanish, and 6 and 5 for the French power grid in two and three contingency cases 
respectively).  Thereafter the cascade shows the single edge failure behaviour. 
 
But for each network, it seems that there is a threshold distance between initially failed 
edges and increasing this distance from zero up to the threshold value will decrease the area 
that could be affected by the cascade. After this threshold, the trend is totally changing as 
the cascade tends to spread in bigger area compared to the values smaller than the threshold. 
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To quantify how aggressively the cascade triggered by concurrent edge removal could grow, 
we define the average cascade globality parameter. This parameter is the indicator of the 
route and distance the cascade will go at next step. Not to mention that the average globality 
value is calculated using EDG introduced in equation (5-1).  
 
 
Fig. 5.  8 Cascade propagation route in biological networks in concurrent edge failure cases.  
In all three networks (C. elegans, Cat cortex, and Macaque cortical), the cascade breakpoint is 3 for two concurrent edge 
removals and 2 for three concurrent edge removals. After this threshold the network treats them like two or three single-
edge removals, which the trend in all figures shows such behavior. 
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A large cascade globality value signifies that from one cascade order to the next one, 
the cascade takes big jumps to spread, making the anticipation of next – to be failed – 
component or even area almost impossible. In other words, the higher is the value of this 
parameter, the more global (and severe) is the cascade. By increasing the average distance 
between the initially failed edges, the cascade propagation radius decreases up to a particular 
point where the average initial contingency hits the breakpoint (e.g. 2 for ER case). 
By increasing the distance between the initially failed edges further than this, a trend 
similar to that of single edge removal case is observed. Indeed, when the distance between 
the concurrently failed edges is more than this breakpoint, their concurrent failure is not 
boosted by superimposing of these two or three single-edge failures at the same time.  
Fig. 5.6 shows the cascade propagation route in synthetic networks (ER, WS, SF) when 
concurrent edge failure happens in the network. There are 200 nodes and around 1000 edges 
in all three types of synthetic networks. In table. 2.3 the structural features of these networks 
are summed up. Not to mention that the distance between initially failed edges can be as 
high as the network diameter which is the highest distance between any pair of nodes in the 
network. While the initially failed edges are structurally near each other, the cascade spreads 
in farther areas since it is obvious from higher average globality values. Then up to a 
breakpoint (which is 2 for all cases except two concurrent edge failures in WS which this 
value is 3) this direction keeps going. The cascade behaviour totally changes after this 
breakpoint where two or three concurrent edge removals happen too far from each other and 
are not able to uplift each other’s destructive impact. That is the reason the cascade 
propagation route follows the single line failure trend. 
Fig 5.7 shows the cascade propagation route in four different power systems 
(Australian, UK, Spanish, and French power grids) while two and three concurrent edge 
failures are imposed on them. Since in some cases the network diameter is as big as 25, in 
this figure, there are bigger distances between initially failed edges. Again, cascade tends to 
propagate in farther areas as the edges are so close together up to a threshold point (8 for 
Australian, 9 for UK, 3 for Spanish, and 6 and 5 for French power grid in two and three 
contingency cases respectively). Thereafter the cascade shows the single edge failure 
inclination. 
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Fig. 5.  9 Cascade propagation route in real (infrastructure) networks in concurrent edge failure cases.  
In some networks, the distance between initially failed edges is so significant which implies that the network diameter is 
a high value. The threshold in US Airport network is 3 and 2 for two and three concurrent edge removals respectively. 
These values for Melbourne natural water are 13and 10, whereas that of Melbourne roads are 10 and 8. After these 
breakpoints, the cascade behaves like single edge removal.  
 
Fig. 5.8 pictures the route the cascade is propagated in biological networks (C. elegans, 
Cat cortex, and Macaque cortical) when they are exposed to two and three concurrent edge 
failures. For all three networks, the cascade breakpoint is 3 for two concurrent edge removals 
and 2 for three concurrent edge removals. After this threshold the network treats them like 
two or three single-edge removals, which the trend in all figures show such a behaviour.  
  
 
5.3 Simulation Results  87 
 
 
Fig. 5.  10 Cascade propagation route for IEEE-57, IEEE-118, and IEEE-300 triggered by single edge removal 
In this case, despite the rest of this chapter so far, the Ford-Fulkerson method is applied to calculate the edges’ loads.  
Red bars represent the average edge geodesic distance for different cascade orders. The error bars show the standard 
deviation. After iterating the single edge removal algorithm (procedure 5.1) on all edges, for each cascade order, the average 
and standard deviation of the edge geodesic distance is calculated. 
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Fig. 5.9 shows the cascade propagation route in concurrent failure cases in real -
infrastructure- networks (US Airport, Melbourne natural water and roads). For US airport 
network when two concurrent edge failures happen, the breakpoint is 2, while that of 
Melbourne natural water and roads are 13 and 10 respectively. Also, in three concurrent edge 
removal case, these values are 2, 10 and 13 respectively depending on the network structure. 
Past this critical point, the concurrent failure propagation shows single edge removal trends. 
When the initially failed edges are close to each other, the cascade spreads in farther areas 
as it is evident from higher average globality values. Then, up to a breakpoint (dip point), 
this trend keeps going. The cascade behaviour changes after this point where two or three 
concurrent failures happen too far from one another and cannot boost each other’s 
destructive impact. That is the reason why the cascade propagation route follows the single 
line failure inclination. 
 
5.3.3 Cascade Propagation Route Based on Ford-Fulkerson Method 
In this section, the cascade propagation methodology introduced in section 5.2 is 
applied on IEEE 57, 118 and  300 (University, 2003) bus networks. Despite the previous 
sections that for monitoring the cascade propagation route, the edge betweenness is applied 
to evaluate the load of edges; in this section, the maximum flow method based on Ford-
Fulkerson explained in section 2.3.5 is used.  
Simulation results for cascade propagation route when it is triggered by single edge 
removal is presented in figures 5.10 to 5.13. Again, the most prominent yield from this set 
of simulations is their conformation to the trends previously observed from cascade 
propagation route in benchmarks introduced in section 2.4, in spite of the difference in the 
mechanism of load calculation. According to these results, in all three IEEE test cases, the 
cascade started by the removal of a single line tends to spread in the vicinity of the initially 
failed edge; then in higher cascade orders it is propagated in farther areas across the network. 
On the other hand, when the cascade is triggered by concurrent edge removal, as the initially 
removed edges are topologically close enough, the cascade tends to spread in farther areas 
since they can boost each other’s destructive impact and cause severer cascades.  
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Fig. 5.  11 Cascade propagation caused by (a) 2 and (b) 3 concurrent edge failures in IEEE-57.  
For this network as it can be seen the breakpoints for two and three concurrent edge removals are 6 and 5 respectively 
and after this point the network show single edge removal sentiment 
 
 
Fig. 5.  12 Cascade propagation caused by (a) 2 and (b) 3 concurrent edge failures in IEEE-118 
For IEEE 118 bus system, the breakpoints for two and three concurrent edge removals are 8 and 7 respectively, implying 
that before these points the concurrent edge removal incidents uplift each other’s effect and thereafter the networks show 
single edge removal impression 
 
For large distances between the initially failed busbars, they can be treated as two 
separate cascades started from different location of the network, and thus will also result in 
a severe cascade. Therefore, it is crucial that when a failure is detected in one of the links, 
its immediate neighbourhood is further protected. This may effectively stop the cascade in 
its early stages.    
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Fig. 5.  13 Cascade propagation caused by (a) 2 and (b) 3 concurrent edge failures in IEEE-300 
Breakpoints for both concurrent edge removals are 8, meaning that from zero up to these points the concurrent edge 
removal events increase each other’s destructive impact. Then, after that, the networks show single edge removal trend 
 
5.4    Conclusion 
In this chapter, we studied the cascade propagation patterns in networks. It investigated 
how cascade failures triggered by initially a single or two- and three-edge concurrent failure 
propagates throughout the network. To this end, first a set of edges fails, then the overall 
load of the network is recalculated, and the edge with the highest load fails if its load is more 
than the predefined threshold value. To calculate the components’ loads in the network, both 
edge betweenness and maximum flow-based centrality measure were adopted. Both these 
methods are adopted by many scholars to allocate the edge loads. Not to mention that highly 
loaded lines behave as bridges in complex networks and their removal will potentially 
disconnect a significant part of the network. The process continues until no edge is 
overloaded, where the cascade stops. As the number of edges sequentially failing as a result 
of this process increases, the cascade becomes severer. We adopt a wide range of synthetic 
and real networks as benchmark networks. When a single edge initially fails, the cascade 
evolves locally up to a particular point, and thereafter it tends to spread globally in farther 
areas all over the network. It gives the network planners and operators the insight that as an 
edge initially fails, the edges surrounding its neighbourhood should be protected as soon as 
possible before the contagion infects the farther areas and get out of control. When two or 
three edges concurrently fail at the initial step, somewhat different behaviour was observed. 
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If the initially removed edges are close, they can boost each other’s destructive role, and 
cause the cascade to spread in farther areas. Also, as the initially failed edges get distant from 
each other, the cascade pervades in these edges’ close neighbourhood. To conclude, in order 
to make a complex network resilient to cascade of failures caused by single edge breakdown, 
it is vital to manage such a failure carefully and deter another component from failure to 
avoid the situation from becoming more complicated. This can be accomplished by 
introducing new protection policies or even putting tighter protection constraints in its 
neighbourhood. However, the network’s condition is already intricate when concurrent edge 
removal happens. To protect a complex network from cascade of failures when such 
excursions happen, more comprehensive studies should be conducted to scrutinize all the 
possible dynamics in complex networks.
   
 
Chapter 6 
 
VULNERABILITY AND LOAD REDUCTION  
IN POWER NETWORKS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
When a power system is in operating condition, it might sustain many changes in its states 
(Dobson et al., 2005c, Motter, 2004, Shekhtman et al., 2016). The power grid may experience 
a generator disruption, demand increasing, outage of transmission lines or even equipment 
failure (Talukdar et al., 2005). Modern networks are increasingly getting connected to less 
predictable intermittent energy sources, i.e. wind energy which was not considered in initial 
power grid design. As a result of all these situations, the power grid may have to operate close 
to its stability limits (Koch et al., 2010). An immediate consequence of this could be a sudden 
change in the power flow in particular transmission lines, bus voltage angles change and so 
on (Pahwa et al., 2013b). Some types of overloads in transmission lines might lead to lines’ 
failure. Repetitive redistribution of the load all over the network may push the power system 
to end up with a blackout (Carreras et al., 2002b).  
Power transmission lines are much more vulnerable than busbars since they are 
physically exposed to the public access in much broader areas, and also remote cyber-attack 
happens to them more often. On the other hand, since the substations are always protected 
physically in a closed area, there are narrower types of attacks to them compared to 
transmission lines. This makes the literature limited in the field of vulnerability study of bus-
bars (Solé et al., 2008a, M. C. Rosa, 2007, Albert et al., 2004, Holmgren, 2006, Wang and 
Rong, 2009).  In the first section of this chapter, we analyze the vulnerability of a synthetic 
and a real power system against a cascade of failures and conclude with a solution to prevent 
the cascade failure to lead to a catastrophic blackout. 
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Shedding some loads is a very effective measure to return the power grid to the stable 
state. This helps maintain the generation-load balance (Hines et al., 2009). Otherwise, the 
infected part of the network should be islanded (Koch et al., 2010, Vaiman et al., 2013, 
Spiewak, 2016, Qi et al., 2015). For a long time, the load shedding has been applied as a 
method of mitigating the overload cascade failure (Aponte and Nelson, 2006, Pahwa et al., 
2013a). But, all these methods lead to customers discomfort and power cut off. In the second 
section of this chapter, we propose a method to mitigate cascade of failures in case a power 
line is getting overloaded. 
 
6.2 Power System Vulnerability 
A number of methods have been proposed to calculate realistic loads for power 
networks (Zhu et al., 2014, Zhu et al., 2012, Zhu et al., 2013). The method based on 
maximum flow (Freeman et al., 1991, Ford and Fulkerson, 1956b), explained in section 
2.2.3, is an appropriate way of obtaining a load of the networks, which will be used in this 
work. Dwivedi et al. (Dwivedi and Yu, 2013) investigated the vulnerability of power systems 
by proposing a maximum flow-based complex network approach. They also introduced a 
centrality index to identify the vulnerable lines based on maximum flow and ranking them 
according to their removal effect on deteriorating the power system performance and 
triggering a pervasive cascade of failures. Moussa et al. (Moussa et al., 2018) investigated 
the vulnerability of power system interdepending with the communication network to failure 
in their single or multiple components. They found that the power system is highly 
vulnerable to the loss of a small set of links. Yang et al. (Yang et al., 2017) identified, 
quantified and analyzed a small but topologically central set of power system components 
which are vulnerable under multiple conditions. If the initial failure happens in the vicinity 
of this set, the power system is more likely to undergo a cascade of failures. Albert et al. 
(Albert et al., 2004) studied the power systems from the network perspective and 
investigated the power delivery from generators to loads when specific nodes are attacked. 
They simulated different attack scenarios including random, degree based, and load-based 
scenarios and concluded that removal of the highest loaded nodes by recalculating the load 
  
 
94  Vulnerability and Load Reduction 
 
in remaining nodes at the end of each ten steps has the most destructive effect on the power 
system functionality. Duenas et al. (Dueñas-Osorio and Vemuru, 2009) modelled the 
overloads due to cascading failures using the tolerance parameter T which is the networks 
elements flow capacity relative to their flow demand. They also followed the cascade in the 
power systems step by step and found that at the first time-step right after the disruption; the 
most significant drop in the network functionality occurs. They derive that to improve the 
power system robustness only updating the T is not enough and the topology of the network 
should be improved to decongest, decentralise the system and increase the number of 
alternative paths in case of any failure occurrence.  
In this section, to study cascade failures in power networks, we consider the IEEE 118 
bus network, shown in Fig. 2.10, and a proper synthetic spatial network model, introduced 
in section 2.3.2, as benchmarks. We then apply the Ford-Fulkerson method, to calculate the 
maximum flow of lines and find the vulnerable edges in the network. Then, the influence of 
random and targeted cascaded failures is investigated. 
 
 
6.2.1 Power System Vulnerability Analysis  
To examine the power system vulnerability, both real and synthetic model networks 
are applied. As a real network, we consider IEEE 118 bus network (Chen and McCalley, 
2005, Machowski et al., 2011), consisting of 19 generators, 9 transformers, 186 lines and 91 
loads as shown in Fig. 2.10. We also introduce a synthetic model to construct a spatially 
extended power network with the source, sink and intermediate nodes which is explained in 
section 2.3.2.  
To study cascade failures in the networks, we apply the method introduced in section 
3.2, (Cij=TWij), where T>1 is the capacity parameter. To study the network robustness 
outline in cascading failures, its behaviour is investigated as a function of the threshold 
parameter T. To do so; we first remove an edge (randomly or the one with the highest 
centrality). Then, the maximum flow algorithm is performed again on the network, and the 
loads are obtained. If a load of an edge is higher than its capacity, the edge fails and is 
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removed from the network. The process continues until no further failure happens in the 
network.   
We study a number of network parameters in the process of cascading failures. To this 
end, the average maximum flows, the normalised number of removed edges SN, and the size 
of the giant component (i.e., the number of nodes in the largest connected component of the 
network) and global efficiency are studied. The flow is delivered through a network via the 
connecting links.  
An important parameter specifying the influence of cascading failures for a network is 
the critical capacity parameter Tc. When T > Tc , no cascading failure occurs, and the system 
functions normally. Indeed, Tc is the minimum value of protection strength to evade 
cascading failure, i.e., the network is resilient against cascading failures with minimum cost 
by setting the capacity parameter as Tc. 
 
 
Fig. 6. 1 Influence of single edge random failure on cascade failure in IEEE-118 
Top left: SN the normalised average number of the removed edges. Top right: Maximum flow calculated using the Ford-
Fulkerson method. Bottom left: Normalized number of survived bus bars after cascade stops (the size of the giant 
component). Bottom right: Network global efficiency. In all figures, the x-axis is the capacity parameter T. Data shows 
averages over 10 realisations. 
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6.2.2 Simulation Results 
First, the influence of cascade failures in the IEEE 118 bus network is studied by 
initially removing an edge randomly from the network. The process is repeated 10 times, 
and the average profiles are reported in the results (Fig. 6.1). As per the figure’s caption, the 
x-axis is the capacity parameter T. Vertical axis parameters are explained in figure titles as 
the average number of the removed edges, maximum flow, the normalised size of the giant 
component, and the network global efficiency. The fitted line is simply a general indicator 
of the parameters change trends before and after the critical capacity Tc. For a specific value 
of T, after one of the links is randomly disconnected, the cascading failures are studied, and 
the performance measures are calculated.  As it is seen from Fig. 6.1, at Tc=1.019 the phase 
transition occurs, and the number of failed edges (SN) suddenly falls from more than 40% to 
zero. Likewise, the maximum flow rises to around 1 from zero. Eventually, the network 
efficiency reaches the initial value (≈0.21) after Tc.  
 
 
Fig. 6. 2 Targeted attack to the edge with the highest normalized centrality in IEEE-118. 
All designations are as for Fig. 6.1. 
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In the second experiment, we study how a targeted attack triggers a cascade of failures 
in the network. To this end, the edge with the highest maximum flow-based centrality, as 
calculated by equation (2-24), is removed from the network, and the cascaded failure 
procedure is run. The results are shown in Fig. 6.2. As can be seen, at  Tc =1.041, the phase 
transition occurs, and SN suddenly falls from more than 60% to zero. The maximum flow 
rises to around 100% from zero. For T < Tc, after the attack to the most vulnerable edge, 
hardly half of network nodes could survive, but with T > Tc, almost none of the busbars fail. 
The critical capacity parameter for a targeted attack is higher than a random failure, which 
means that the cost of network protection against attacks is higher than random failures. 
 
 
Fig. 6. 3 Impact of random attack (fault) to one edge of the synthetic networks 
(see text for explanation of the model and the parameters set up). Other designations are as for Fig. 6.1. 
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Fig. 6.3 displays the behaviour of the synthetic model network when one of its edges 
is randomly removed. For this case, the critical capacity parameter is Tc=1.007, which 
demonstrates better robustness compared to Tc = 1.019 for IEEE 118 bus network. 
 
Fig. 6. 4 Targeted attack to the edge with the highest normalised centrality in the synthetic network. 
Other determinations are the same as Fig. 6.1. 
 
Fig. 6.4 shows the performance of the same model network exposed to a cascaded 
failure caused by a targeted attack on the most central edge in the model network. For this 
case, we discover the critical capacity parameter as Tc = 1.018, which implies that the model 
network is less tolerant than IEEE 118 bus network with Tc = 1.041. Not to mention that 
again, in the case of targeted attacks, the general behaviour of the metrics with respect to the 
capacity parameter is similar in two networks.  
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These results show that IEEE 118 bus network has better tolerance than the synthetic 
spatial power networks, which indeed indicates intelligent engineering design for this 
network. However, its robustness can still be improved by some structural interventions, 
which can be a relevant subject for future studies. 
 
6.3 Load Reduction in Power Networks  
 Here we propose a method to rank the loads to be reduced to tackle the overload in a 
particular line which otherwise might drag the power system to instability. First, we perform 
the load flow analysis to evaluate initial conditions just before the occurrence of an overload 
in the transmission lines. Then, for a particular line working close to its loading limitation, 
the algorithm will nominate a few loads which are fed through that line. Now, using the tree 
traverse method, only those loads which absorb the higher portion of their power from that 
line will be finalized to be ranked. Then, using a set of a partial differential algorithm, the 
sensitivity of line power to the power change in those loads will be evaluated. The higher is 
the sensitivity value for a load, the more sensitive would be the line power to the power 
change in that specific load and also the higher would be the rank of that load. Load reduction 
algorithm begins from the top-ranked loads and reduces them hierarchically until the power 
flow in the line gets back to a normal range. 
 
6.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis and Load Reduction 
In this section, the basis for sensitivity analysis and loads ranking is explained. We 
begin with power flow in a single transmission line and then using power flow equations the 
algorithm is extended to find the particular line’s power sensitivity to any arbitrary load’s 
change. 
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6.3.2 Sensitivity Parameters 
To consider an accurate flow dispatch, (Peschon et al., 1968) proposed the first-order 
sensitivity equations which then adopted by others. Huang et al. (Huang and Yao, 2012), 
introduced a new Jacobian-based distribution factor to solve the complex power flow in real-
time. In this section, in order to deter a nearly overloaded power system transmission line 
from failure, a sensitivity analysis method is introduced to rank the loads to be reduced. 
 
Fig. 6. 5 Line l connecting buses vi and vj 
 
Fig. 6.5 shows the diagram of a single transmission line connecting busbars vi and vj.  Iij 
shows the current delivered from busbar vi to busbar vj. R and X represent the line’s resistance 
and reactance respectively. The line impedance and admittance is calculated from circuit 
theory as: 
 𝑍𝑖𝑗∠𝜃𝑧 = 𝑅 + 𝑗𝑋 (6-1) 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗∠𝜃𝑦 =
1
𝑍𝑖𝑗∠𝜃𝑧
  (6-2) 
where Zij and θz are the magnitude and angle of line impedance. Also Yij and θy stand for line 
admittance amplitude and angle respectively. The current in the line can be calculated as:  
𝐼𝑖𝑗 =
𝑣𝑖−𝑣𝑗
𝑅+𝑗𝑥
=
𝑉𝑖∠𝛿𝑖−𝑉𝑗∠𝛿𝑗
𝑍𝑖𝑗∠𝜃𝑧
= 𝑌𝑖𝑗∠𝜃𝑦(𝑉𝑖∠𝛿𝑖 − 𝑉𝑗∠𝛿𝑗)  = 𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑖∠(𝛿𝑖 + 𝜃𝑦) − 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑗
∠(𝛿𝑗 + 𝜃𝑦)   (6-3) 
where Vi and Vj are the voltage magnitudes of busbars vi and vj. Likewise, δi and δj are the 
voltage angles of busesbars vi and vj respectively. The conjugate of the current is calculated 
from:  
 𝐼𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖∠(−𝛿𝑖 − 𝜃𝑦) − 𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑗∠(−𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦)  (6-4) 
and the apparent power can be calculated as: 
 𝑆𝑖𝑗 = 𝑉𝑖∠𝛿𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖
2∠(𝛿𝑖−𝛿𝑖 − 𝜃𝑦) − 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖. 𝑉𝑗∠(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) 
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 = 𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑖
2∠(−𝜃𝑦) − 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖. 𝑉𝑗∠(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) (6-5) 
From this equation, the active and reactive power delivered by the line can be evaluated by 
(Kundur, 1994, Machowski, 2008):  
 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑅𝑒(𝑆𝑖𝑗) = 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖
2. 𝑐𝑜𝑠(−𝜃𝑦) − 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖. 𝑉𝑗. 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦)(6-6) 
 𝑄𝑖𝑗 = 𝐼𝑚(𝑆𝑖𝑗) = 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖
2. 𝑠𝑖𝑛(−𝜃𝑦) − 𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑖. 𝑉𝑗 . 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦)(6-7) 
Pij and Qij are the line’s active and reactive powers respectively. Re(.) and Im(.) stand for 
real and imaginary parts of a complex number. 
Now, we suppose that any change in active and reactive power in an arbitrary load in 
the power system has an effect on active and reactive power of line eij (between busbars vi 
and vj) (Huang and Yao, 2012). Therefore, we can formulate this change as:   
 ∆𝑃𝑖𝑗 = ∑
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑙=1 . ∆𝑃𝑙 + ∑
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑙
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑙=1 . ∆𝑄𝑙  (6-8) 
In the above equation, ΔPij is the line’s active power change. Also, ΔPl is active power 
change of load vl. In this equation, we denominate the quantities 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
 and 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑙
  as the 
sensitivity of line eij active power to active and reactive power change in load vl respectively. 
Using partial differential equation, we can evaluate these sensitivity parameters as 
functions of buses’ voltages and angles. 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
= ∑
𝜕𝑉𝑘
𝜕𝑃𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑘
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑘=1 + ∑
𝜕𝛿𝑘
𝜕𝑃𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑘
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑘=1   (6-9) 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑙
= ∑
𝜕𝑉𝑘
𝜕𝑄𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑘
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑘=1 + ∑
𝜕𝛿𝑘
𝜕𝑄𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑘
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑘=1    (6-10) 
where NBus is a number of buses in the power system. Since line eij is linking the bus vi 
and the bus vj, the flow 𝑃𝑖𝑗 will only be related to Vi, Vj, δi and δj. Thus, 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
=
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑖
+
𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑗
+
𝜕𝛿𝑖
𝜕𝑃𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑖
+
𝜕𝛿𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑗
 (6-11) 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑙
=
𝜕𝑉𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑖
+
𝜕𝑉𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑗
+
𝜕𝛿𝑖
𝜕𝑄𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑖
+
𝜕𝛿𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑙
.
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑗
 (6-12) 
From load flow analysis we know that:  
 [∆𝑃
∆𝑄
] = [
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝛿
      
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝛿
     
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑉
] [∆𝛿
∆𝑉
] (6-13) 
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in the above equation, the partial derivative matrix is called the Jacobian matrix. If we 
multiply the inverse of Jacobian matrix by equation 6-13 from left, we have a new equation 
as: 
 [∆𝛿
∆𝑉
] = [
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑃
      
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑃
     
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑄
] [∆𝑃
∆𝑄
]  (6-14) 
which is the key equation for values needed in equation 6-8. 
By differentiating equations 6-6 and 6-7, we have:  
 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑖
= 2𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖
 . 𝑐𝑜𝑠(−𝜃𝑦) − 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑗. 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) (6-15) 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑗
= −𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑖
 . 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) (6-16) 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑖
= 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖. 𝑉𝑗. 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) (6-17) 
 
𝜕𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑗
= −𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑖. 𝑉𝑗 . 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) (6-18) 
 
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑖
= 2𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑖
 . 𝑠𝑖𝑛(−𝜃𝑦) − 𝑌𝑖𝑗 . 𝑉𝑗. 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) (6-19) 
 
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑗
= −𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑗
 . 𝑠𝑖𝑛(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) (6-20) 
 
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑖
= −𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑖. 𝑉𝑗 . 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦)  (6-21) 
 
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑗
= 𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝑉𝑖. 𝑉𝑗 . 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝛿𝑖 − 𝛿𝑗 − 𝜃𝑦) (6-22) 
These values are all we need in equations 6-11 and 6-12 to calculate the sensitivities. 
Likewise, we can write all these equations for the line’s reactive power sensitivity to an 
arbitrary load’s active or reactive power change: 
 ∆𝑄𝑖𝑗 = ∑
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑙=1 . ∆𝑃𝑙 + ∑
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑄𝑙
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑙=1 . ∆𝑄𝑙  (6-23) 
Again, ΔQij is the line’s reactive power change. Here, in this equation, we call 
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
 and 
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑙
 as 
the sensitivity of line eij reactive power to active and reactive power change in load l, 
respectively. Also, we can evaluate these centrality indices as functions of buses’ voltages 
and angles. 
 
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
= ∑
𝜕𝑉𝑘
𝜕𝑃𝑙
.
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑘
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑘=1 + ∑
𝜕𝛿𝑘
𝜕𝑃𝑙
.
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑘
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑘=1   (6-24) 
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𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑄𝑙
= ∑
𝜕𝑉𝑘
𝜕𝑄𝑙
.
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑉𝑘
𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠
𝑘=1 + ∑
𝜕𝛿𝑘
𝜕𝑄𝑙
.
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝛿𝑘
   𝑁𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑘=1   (6-25) 
The partial differential 
𝜕𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑃𝑙
 explains how the reactive power of line eij evolves when the 
active power in load l changes. Now that we have all sensitivity equations ready, for any 
nominated line, we can easily rank the loads according to their impact on that particular 
line’s power flow 
 
6.3.3 Choosing the Loads to Be Reduced 
For any network with NBus nodes and NPQ loads, suppose that the power flow in the 
line eij is close to its limitation, the algorithm aims to select a set of loads whose power 
reduction can bring the power flow in that individual line back into a normal range. The 
algorithm could be summed up as follows. First, the load flow analysis is performed to 
evaluate the lines power flow or loading level. According to this information, a directed 
graph is defined as a model of power grid where the weights on edges are equal to the flows 
in the corresponding transmission lines. Since the graph is directed, all the weights are 
positive. Now, by implementing the graph theory pathfinding fundamentals, the algorithm 
will traverse inside the tree to find the loads fed from the transmission line eij Then, from 
this set, only those loads whose more significant part of power come from the line eij will 
remain in the set. This is the final set of loads whose elements should be prioritised from 1 
to nL according to their effect on the line eij power flow. In this set, nL is the number of items. 
To do so, the sensitivity analysis method which comprehensively explained in section A, will 
be implemented to compute the line i-j power flow sensitivity to the change in the loads’ 
power and according to those indices, the loads will be ranked from 1 to nL. The higher the 
rank is, the more effective the load on line i-j power flow is. 
 
6.3.4 Simulation Results 
We apply the algorithm on IEEE 57 bus network shown in Fig. 2.11. As discussed in the 
previous sections, before running the algorithm in this test case, we perform the load flow 
analysis on the network to get the initial values for the voltage and angle of the buses, lines 
  
 
104  Vulnerability and Load Reduction 
 
active and reactive delivered power and also lines loading levels to check if any line is 
working close to its loading limitation. Now, we nominate a line which is about to be 
overloaded which in this case, we choose the line connecting the busbars 15 and 14. The flow 
direction is from bus 15 to 14. We suppose that an overall load rise has happened which is 
about to overload the line 15→14. At the next stage, we propose a method to discover the 
loads responsible for its overloading. According to the algorithm explained in previous 
section, a set of loads to be reduced is chosen and ranked using the sensitivity analysis 
method. The nominated loads getting at least a portion of their power from line 15→14 are 
as follows:  
[14, 56, 46, 48, 38, 47, 37, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 39, 57] 
After traversing the network tree, only the following set is finalized for load reduction:  
[14, 38, 47, 32, 33, 35,57, 31] 
To have a better assessment of the results, we compare them with that of DIgSILENT 
simulation which is applied as the ground truth. Power Factory DIgSILENT is an eminent 
power system investigation software used in generation, transmission, distribution and 
industrial systems analysis. It also offers a wide variety of power system functionalities 
ranging from classic properties to highly complicated and modern applications consisting 
wind power generation, distributed generation, simulation in a real-time manner and 
monitoring the performance of the system as means of system test and supervision. Being 
easy to apply and windows environment-friendly application, it is a combination of credible 
and pliable capabilities for modelling the power systems with cutting edge algorithms and a 
unique database significance. It is also highly flexible for interfacing which makes it a 
perfect option in automated solutions for business cases. 
In Fig. 6.6, the results from DIgSILENT are presented. At t=10s, a 10MW jump is 
applied for the loads mentioned in the previous section. As it can be observed, the 10MW 
increment in load #12, has the highest effect on line 15→14 current as it jumps from 
0.995[pu] to 1.018[pu] which shows 8.6% increase from its initial condition. Likewise, the 
change for other loads is sketched in Fig. 6.6 and the final level of line current are shown in 
the sections. The loads are ordered according to their influence on the line flow. As can be 
seen, the loads are ranked according to their sensitivity as follows: 
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[14, 47, 38, 57, 35, 32, 33, 31] 
Also, their sensitivity flow vector is  
[ 1.081, 1.047, 1.020, 1.018, 1.018, 1.015, 1.015, 1.011] 
where the value 1.011 corresponds to the less sensitivity pertains to load #31.  
The comparison between the proposed algorithm performance and the DIgSILENT is 
summarized in table. 6.1. It is evident that the results of the proposed method based on 
sensitivity analysis are in a good match with the result from DIgSILENT in ranking the loads 
according to their effect on the line’s power flow. The only discrepancy is at ranks 7 and 8, 
which the algorithm implies that despite the results from DIgSILENT, at the 7th priority, it 
is preferred that the load #31 is chosen to be reduced instead of the load #33. It is worth 
mentioning that the sensitivity parameters in table. 6.1 have no unit since in all equations 6-
11, 6-12, 6-23, 6-24, both numerator and denominator are in per unit (pu). In the next section, 
the ranking correlation is calculated between the results from the algorithm and that of 
DIgSILENT to quantify the performance of this method. 
 
Table. 6.   1 Summary of the results from DIgSILENT and Sensitivity methods’ ranking 
Load 
# 
Current 
[pu] 
DIgSILENT 
rank 
Sensitivity 
Sensitivity 
rank 
Load 
# 
14 1.081 1 0.1179 1 14 
47 1.047 2 0.0957 2 47 
38 1.020 3 0.0762 3 38 
57 1.018 4 0.0708 4 57 
35 1.018 4 0.0684 5 35 
32 1.015 6 0.0622 6 32 
33 1.015 6 0.0578 8 33 
31 1.011 8 0.0608 7 31 
 
6.3.5 Kendall’s Tau Correlation 
We apply Kendall’s Tau Correlation to find the correlation between rankings R 
computed using the algorithm and the ground truth σ. This correlation can be calculated as: 
 𝜏(𝜎, 𝑅) =
𝑛𝑐−𝑛𝑑
0.5𝑛(𝑛−1)
  (6-26) 
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Table. 6.   2 Kendall’s Tau correlation between the DIgSILENT and Sensitivity methods’ rankings 
DIgSILENT 
rank 
Sensitivity 
rank 
C D 
1 1 7 0 
2 2 6 0 
3 3 5 0 
4 4 4 0 
4 5 3 0 
6 6 2 0 
6 8 0 1 
8 7   
  nc=27 nd=1 
with nc, nd and n being the number of concordant and discordant pairs and the size of ranking 
array respectively. Two pairs (σi,ri), (σj,rj) are concordant if (σi<σj and ri<rj) at the same time 
or if (σi>σj and ri>rj) at the same time. Otherwise, they are discordant. Now, we are ready to 
calculate the correlation between rank calculated by DIgSILENT and the rank calculated by 
sensitivity algorithm. Table 6.2 summarizes the calculation. 
Hence, for this case, the Kindall’s Tau correlation between the DIgSILENT and Sensitivity 
methods’ rankings will be:  
𝜏(𝜎, 𝑅) =
27 − 1
0.5 ∗ 8 ∗ (8 − 1)
= 0.9285 
Which shows a very good match between ground truth and algorithm rankings. 
It is worth mentioning that when it comes to larger networks, the proposed sensitivity 
analysis is much more time-efficient than traditional iterative methods based on numerical 
solution methods for problem-solving. Since the iterative methods highly depend on initial 
conditions and solution settings, it is more likely that they get trapped in a local solution and 
suffer from divergence; where the proposed sensitivity-based method, solves the problem 
only according to the system differential equations and there will not be any iteration because 
it applies the system last working information or load flow analysis before the contingency 
or overloading happens.  
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Fig. 6. 6 Line 15→14 current [pu] for a 10 MW increase in the demand of 8 different loads at time t=10s. 
The order of the loads (14, 47, 38, 35, 57, 32, 33, 31) shows the extent of their effect on overloading the line 15→14.  
x-axis shows the time (seconds) and y-axis represents the per unit current in the line 15→14.  
 
Load #14 Load #47 
Load #38 Load #35 
Load #57 Load #32 
Load #33 Load #31 
1.081 [pu] 
1.047 
1.020 
1.018 
1.018 
1.015 
1.015 
1.011 
t=10s 
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6.4 Conclusion 
In the first part of this chapter, the vulnerability of power systems to cascading failures 
was put under scrutiny. IEEE 118 busbar network was considered as a benchmark network. 
Also, a synthetic spatial power network with a controllable number of generators, loads and 
network density was generated and investigated. A recently proposed maximum flow-based 
model was used to weight the links, resulting in a proper centrality measure for the links. 
The capacity of the links is proportional to their centrality value. A number of performance 
measures (the size of the connected component, the number of failed edges, the maximum 
flow and the global efficiency of the network) were studied as functions of the capacity 
parameter. The critical capacity parameter was found for each case, setting the parameter 
higher than that results in making the networks resilient against cascade failure.  
In the second part of this chapter, we studied a novel method to mitigate the cascade 
failures in power grids. The power grid is one of the most vital engineering networks in the 
society, and any failure in even one component (a transmission line or a busbar) can lead to 
a cascade of failures in all over the network which is known as a blackout. To protect the 
power grids from such catastrophes, we proposed a sensitivity analysis method for ranking 
the loads -to be reduced- to deter a particular nearly-overloaded line i→j from breakdown. 
In this method, we first chose a set of loads which get fed from this line. Then by traversing 
in the tree beginning from node j and including all the loads in that set and also their 
connecting busbar, we chose the final set of loads by shortlisting the nodes whose the more 
significant portion of the power came from the line i→j. According to the proposed method, 
we can calculate the sensitivity of the flow in line i→ j to the load increase in any arbitrary 
load in the network. By applying this method to the shortlisted loads, we can rank the loads 
according to their effect on the special line current.  
We compared our findings with the simulation results from the DIgSILENT software 
designating that the proposed method can effectively rank the loads to be reduced (to deter 
the cascade failure in the power grid) even faster, primarily when the algorithm deals with 
bigger networks and traditional methods suffer from divergence. This method can be 
effectively implemented with much less calculation, and complexity compared to 
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conventional methods even on the slower processors and lower available memories. It might 
be worthwhile to further conduct an extensive study on the effect of parameter variations on 
the cascade failure evolution. 
 
   
 
Chapter 7 
 
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, first, the results from previous chapters are summarised in section 7.2. 
Then, section 7.3 draws a bigger picture of the cascade failure field in complex networks 
especially power systems and gives some recommendations for the future works in this 
subject. 
 
7.2 Research Findings Summary 
Cascade failures in complex networks make the communication fail in their 
components and lead to a major loss in network functionality. Especially in the case of power 
systems, cascade failure is the main reason for significant power outages which most of the 
times is triggered by a single component failure and gets propagated across the network.  
In this thesis, first, the correlation between cascade failures and the structural centrality 
measures was discussed by studying the cascade depth structural metric for each node in the 
network. Three structural centralities among others were pointed out to have the most impact 
on nodes vitality and be applied to control the complex network functionality during the 
cascade of failures. We found that the nodes with higher degree centralities show negative 
correlation with cascade depth and to some extent behave like fuses which despite 
disconnecting a small portion of the network can preserve a substantial part of it.  
Next, the cascade propagation pathway was studied when it got triggered by two 
distinct failure events, single or concurrent edge removal, and the difference between 
preventive measures was discussed. It was concluded that to make a complex network 
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resilient to cascade of failures caused by single edge break down, it is crucial to manage such 
a failure carefully before another edge gets removed. This can be done by putting more 
protection on the vicinity of that edge. However, concurrent edge removal is much more 
complicated and protecting the network under such events needs comprehensive studies. 
Also in the first part of the last chapter, the vulnerability of power systems against 
different attack scenarios to power transmission lines was put under scrutiny, and the critical 
capacity for transmission lines was computed. The methodology was examined on both 
synthetic and real power systems. It is shown that by setting the capacity parameter higher 
than its critical value, the network will be resilient against cascade failures. Finally, in the 
second part of last chapter, a novel load reduction method for the case that a single 
transmission line is about to get overloaded was introduced and simulated. The results were 
compared to ground-truth results. The simulation results were compared with that of 
DIgSILENT software implying that the proposed method can effectively rank the loads to 
be reduced (to deter the cascade failure in the power grid) even faster hence this method can 
be effectively implemented with much less calculation, and complexity compared to 
conventional methods. The main contributions can be summarized as below: 
1. For power system vital node identification, in chapter four 
(a) Introduced a new metric to find the node cascade depth which is the 
number of removed nodes as a result of that particular node’s failure 
(b) Conducted a correlation analysis between cascading failures and node 
structural centralities 
2. For the cascade pathway analysis in chapter five, 
(a) Introduced an algorithm to calculate the cascade propagation route when 
the cascade is triggered by a single edge failure using the edge geodesic 
distance 
(b) Developed an algorithm to calculate the cascade propagation pathway 
for the case that cascade is triggered by concurrent edge removal 
3. For the vulnerability analysis in chapter six, 
(a) Generated a synthetic power network according to the existing real 
power system structural properties 
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(b) Computed the transmission lines critical capacity to avoid the cascade of 
failures  
4. For the selective load reduction method proposed in chapter six, 
(a) Introduced a novel traverse method for finding the best candidate set of 
loads in the power system to rank for each transmission line 
(b) Formulated a new line power flow sensitivity method for rating the 
loads based on inverse Jacobian matrix 
7.3 Future Research Directions 
In further research, there are many aspects to the cascade failure in power systems 
which could be examined subsequently. Some of the possible directions for future research 
are listed as follows. 
 
7.3.1 Considering Different Node Types 
In chapter four, we analysed a wide range of synthetic and real networks to discover 
the vital nodes in complex networks. In all those simulations, the nodes were assumed to be 
similar for simplicity. In future work, different types of nodes depending on the network 
functionality can be considered. Considering the variety of component types in simulations 
rather than having them all identical can lead to first, a better understanding of complex 
networks dynamics, second, achieving better and more realistic strategies for catastrophe 
management, and third, building future networks more resilient to various failures. For 
instance, in power systems, there are three main busbar types: generators, intermediate 
busbars, and loads. Also, the capacity of nodes can be considered while delivering the flow 
across the network. 
 
7.3.2 Studying Dynamical Behaviour Using Cloud Computing 
One of the biggest limitations in studying dynamical power systems behaviour is 
computational boundaries. Most of simulations in this thesis, even when the considered 
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models are not complicated, were run on desktop computers and in some cases especially 
for bigger networks it took weeks to come up with the results.  
Undoubtedly, when more dynamics are to be considered like power systems short term 
response to generators augmentation, big loads curtailment, or the power system oscillatory 
behaviour investigation before reaching a steady-state; needs a huge computational resource 
which is only available using cloud computing facilities. For the latter case, if the high-
frequency oscillation gets simply ignored, they can trigger protection relays and make some 
unforeseen trips to power system components. For instance, when in chapter five, the 
cascade propagation route is scrutinized, we assume that the power system reaches a new 
steady-state by simply ignoring the oscillations right before that. Another example could be 
the time when large power systems with thousands of busbars are modelled and also different 
types of generation including traditional power plants as well as renewables like wind farms 
and aggregated solar farms each with their own technical specifications, exist in the power 
system, any simplification makes the simulations less accurate which shows the need for 
such computational facilities.  
 
7.3.3 Optimisation  of Reduced Loads 
In chapter six, the best candidate loads were determined to be ranked for reduction so 
that the load in a particular power line does not exceed its boundaries. Depending on the 
sensitivity values, an objective function can be defined, and the reduction parameters can be 
optimised to minimise the overall curtailed load across the network. In this way, the 
optimised amount that each load should shed is computed with subject to returning the power 
line’s flow to its limitations. This would be helpful to better operate power systems. First, 
minimising the overall amount of load - to be shed - will increase the power system reliability 
as a smaller quantity of loads needs to be disconnected. Second, this method will combine 
the busbars, which need to react and probably lowers the pressure on few loads by more 
contributions from various load centres. Third, by conducting a distributed overload control, 
the chance of malfunctioning in all metering and protection controls is decreased, and hence 
the probability of triggering a cascade of failure will be reduced.
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